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I. INTRODUCTION
One in every four women in America will be raped or physically as-
saulted by a date or an intimate partner (a spouse, a cohabitant, a former
spouse, or a former cohabitant) sometime during her life.' Each year, nearly
five million American women are raped or physically assaulted by an inti-
mate partner.2 Another half-a-million will be stalked by an intimate
partner.3 Despite the obviously criminal nature of such violent and threat-
ening behavior, most of it will not be reported to law enforcement; it will
remain a private, family matter, hidden from public view or condemna-
tion.'
In recent years, domestic violence has begun to emerge from behind
the closed doors and drawn shades which have traditionally hidden it from
public scrutiny. The severity and pervasiveness of domestic violence has
shocked those of us fortunate enough to have had little personal experience
with it. The severity and pervasiveness of domestic violence make it one of
America's primary social, public health, and legal issues. But while the di-
mensions of domestic violence are now known to be large, domestic
violence is still often largely ignored. Even though the problem of domestic
violence is both obvious and enormous, the violence far too frequently
1. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF IN-
TIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN SURVEY iii (July 2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at v. (One-fifth of rapes, one-quarter of physical assaults, and one-half of stalkings are
reported).
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lurks in the shadows of ignorance and apathy, its causes and effects given
short shrift.
Ignoring the problem of domestic violence has not made it go away,
nor will it. Domestic violence will go away only with a concerted effort on
the part of virtually every element of society. This article is about one ele-
ment of society, the legal system, which is uniquely positioned to play a
significant role in addressing domestic violence and its effects. Although
uniquely positioned, the legal system has, thus far, failed to have the impact
it could and should have, primarily because of ignorance and apathy.5 It is
time for the ignorance and apathy to end and for the legal profession to
become actively involved in attempts to mitigate the causes and effects of
domestic violence. However, addressing apathy is not enough. Ignorance,
alone, can effectively prevent lawyers and judges from responding promptly
and properly to cases involving domestic violence. Without proper training,
lawyers may actually harm, rather than help, their clients who are victims of
domestic violence, a clear violation of their ethical and legal obligation to
help clients. Without proper training, judges may enter orders with similar
results. This article attempts to address both the ignorance and apathy of
lawyers and judges when dealing with domestic violence issues. Apathy of-
ten ends with awareness. Ignorance can end with information.
Lawyers and judges should be the vanguard of those working to end
domestic violence and mitigate its effects, yet they are not. This article is an
attempt to change that. It strives to shed some light on the profound effect
domestic violence has on law and law practice, as well as the profound ef-
fect lawyers and the legal system can have on domestic violence. Part II of
this article demonstrates the extent and pervasiveness of domestic violence.
5. The legal protections available to victims have improved substantially in the last twenty
years. Congress and state legislatures have enacted important laws which provide at least
the possibility of legal protections when properly and promptly utilized by lawyers and
courts. In 1994, for example, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Vio-
lence Against Women Act (VAWA). 42 U.S.C. % 13981-14050 (2002). It provides for
"a national domestic violence hotline, a new federal civil rights cause of action for victims
. .. many new or increased criminal provisions, confidentiality of victim addresses, im-
migration relief for battered spouse and children, research . . . and funding for many
programs." Nancy K.D. Lemon, The Violence Against Women Act, in THE IMPACT OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE 9--1 (Deborah M. Goelman, et al. eds.,
American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence 1996). VAWA was reau-
thorized in 2000. Pub.L. No. 106-386. Civil protection orders are available in all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and all territories of the United States.
Catherine F. Klein & Leslie E. Orloff, Civil Protection Orders, in THE IMPACT OF Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE at 4-1 (Deborah M. Goelman, et al. eds.,
American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence 1996). The efficacy of
such orders is uncertain.
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Part III describes how domestic violence will affect a lawyer's practice. Part
IV provides guidance on what a lawyer should do to determine if a prospec-
tive client or a current client is involved in domestic violence, and, if so,
how the lawyer should assist the prospective client or client in taking meas-
ures to protect against future violence. Finally, Part V addresses a lawyer's
duty to warn non-clients of possible domestic violence by a client. This ar-
ticle is, in sum, about what a reasonable lawyer should know about
domestic violence and what that reasonable lawyer should do with that
knowledge.
II. THE EXTENT AND PERVASIVENESS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
For centuries, society has viewed domestic violence as a private family
affair, properly immune from public scrutiny or public intervention. That
view has fostered the belief, all too common among victims, as well as oth-
ers, that domestic violence is the fault of the victims, rather than the fault of
those who inflict the violence. As a result, it has been very difficult to get
an accurate picture of the extent and pervasiveness of domestic violence. In
recent years, several attempts have been made to this end.7 While there are
some differences among the results of those efforts, a singular picture
emerges from all. Domestic violence is both brutal and common.
A. The Pervasiveness of Domestic Violence
Although domestic violence is no longer considered to be a private
matter, it is still difficult to get an accurate picture of its true magnitude.
Whatever information one considers, however, the scope of the problem is
staggering.
The most comprehensive attempt to define the extent of domestic vio-
lence is a nationwide survey conducted by the National Institutes ofJustice
(NIJ) and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), acting under the aus-
pices of the United States Department ofJustice. Eight-thousand men and
eight-thousand women were surveyed. Domestic violence, concludes the
6. See, e.g., R.B. Siegel, The Rule ofLove: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996) ("The Anglo-American common law originally provided that a
husband, as master of his household, could subject his wife to corporal punishment or
'chastisement' so long as he did not inflict permanent injury upon her.").
7. For a discussion of different surveys and their differing findings, see TJADEN & THOEN-
NES, supra note 1, at 19-24.
8. See generally, TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1.
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report, "is a pervasive and serious social problem in the United States." 9
The NIJ/CDC Report is shocking.
The NIJ/CDC survey found that one of every four women in America
will be raped or physically assaulted by a date or an intimate partner (a co-
habitant, a spouse, a former cohabitant, or a former spouse) at some point
in her life.'0 Each year, nearly five million women are raped or physically
assaulted by an intimate partner. Another half million women will be
stalked by a current or former intimate partner. Most of the violence, how-
ever, is never reported to law enforcement.1'
The CDC has obtained additional information about adolescent vic-
tims of domestic violence. The CDC designed a Youth Risk Behavior
Survey (YRBS), which measures the prevalence of youth health concerns. 2
In 1997 and 1999, the YRBS administered by the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts contained questions about the prevalence of sexual and physical
violence. Approximately 2,000 high school girls in Massachusetts answered
the survey each year.' 3 The results are horrifying. One in five female stu-
dents in grades nine through twelve reported that she had experienced
physical and/or sexual abuse by a dating partner."' As if such violence were
not bad enough, the survey disclosed that dating violence often creates an
array of additional problems, such as increased risk of substance abuse, un-
healthy weight gain, risky sexual behaviors, pregnancy, consideration of
suicide, and suicide attempts.15
Men, of course, are not just batterers; they are also the victims of do-
mestic violence.' 6 Batterers, however, are overwhelmingly male, and victims
are overwhelmingly female. In fact, eighty-five percent of domestic violence
victims are women." Nationwide, women experience significantly more
9. Id. at 55.
10. Id. at iii-v. A recent study reported that twenty percent of adolescent girls, ages fourteen
through eighteen, are victims of physical or sexual assault. Erica Goode, Study Says 20%
of Girls ReportedAbused by a Date, N.Y. TIMES, August 1, 2001, at Al0.
11. TIADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at v. (One-fifth of rapes, one-quarter of physical
assaults, and one-half of stalkings are reported).
12. For a description of the YRBS, seeJ.G. Silverman et al., Dating Violence AmongAdoles-
cent Girls and Associated Substance Use, Unhealthy Weight Control, Sexual Risk Behavior,
Pregnancy, and Suicidality, 265 JAMA 572, 573 (2001).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 574.
15. Id. at 577.
16. Roberta Valente, Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law Practitioner,
29 FAM. L.Q. 187 (1995); Jeffery Edeleson et al., Men Who Batter Women, 6 J. FAMILY
ISSUES 229 (1985).
17. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, PH.D. & SARAH WELCHANS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 1
(May 2000).
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violence from male intimate partners than men experience from female in-
timate partners."' Accordingly, this article refers to victims as women and
batterers as men.
Domestic violence touches virtually all facets of society. The American
Medical Association (AMA) describes domestic violence as "a public health
problem that has reached epidemic proportions. "' 9 Although domestic vio-
lence occurs in all socio-economic, educational, cultural, and racial groups,
it does not occur at the same rates. Some research shows, for example, that
domestic violence is more prevalent among women who are unmarried but
co-habitating, are pregnant, have lower-incomes, have less education,
and/or are minorities. 2" Further, there are some reported differences in rates
of domestic violence among various minority groups; more research is
needed to determine whether the differences result from racial or other fac-
tors." Whatever its cause, domestic violence is so common that it is the
leading cause of homelessness and poverty for women and children.
Children, too, are frequently victims of domestic violence. The vio-
lence may be direct, in which case the harm is obvious. Children are also
victims when they are never touched but are exposed to violence against
their mothers. Researchers have amassed "an impressive body of empirical
data demonstrating the negative impact of exposure to domestic violence
upon children's psychological development and functioning. 23 The harm is
varied, serious, and long term.
Children exposed to domestic violence "may develop a range of social,
emotional, and academic problems, including aggressive conduct, anxiety
symptoms, emotional withdrawal, and serious difficulties in school. '2'4 They
are also "more likely than are children from nonviolent homes to develop
emotional and adjustment problems as adults, including repetition of the
patterns of violence they observed as children., 25 The nature and extent of
harm caused to children by exposure to domestic violence is similar to the
18. See, e.g., Silverman et al., supra note 12, at 572-73. Women in lesbian relationships also
experience significantly less violence than women in straight relationships or men in gay
relationships. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 56.
19. Am. MED. Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT GUIDELINES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 4
(1994).
20. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 33.
21. Id. at 56.
22. Sarah Buel, Domestic Violence and the Law: An Impassioned Explorationfor Family Peace,
33 FAM. L.Q. 719, 731 (1999).
23. See Lois Weithorn, Protecting Children From Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and
Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1,4 (2001).
24. Id. at 6; see also CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMAN AND
THE LAw 240-66 (2001).
25. Weithorn, supra note 23, at 6.
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harm experienced by children who are direct victims of physical or sexual
21
abuse. It is clear, therefore, that children's exposure to either direct vio-
lence or violence against their mothers is extremely harmful.
Violence against children is a topic unto itself, deserving of more com-
plete treatment and will not be directly addressed in this article.27
B. Defining and Understanding the Dynamics of Domestic Violence
A lawyer who focuses strictly on a client's legal needs may be ineffec-
28tive. Effective representation often requires more than simply solving a
client's legal problem and "[a] good lawyer is not only interested in protect-
ing the client's legal rights, but also in the well-being and mental and
physical health of the client."'" When a client is a victim of domestic vio-
lence, practical considerations, such as personal safety and the safety of
children, are often paramount. Accordingly, effective representation re-
quires identifying domestic violence and understanding the dynamics of a
domestic violence situation. Since a batterer's reasons for battering and a
victim's reaction to domestic violence often appear counter-intuitive, tradi-
tional approaches and assumptions to resolving a client's problem may
prove ineffective in meeting a client's objectives. °
Defining domestic violence is both difficult and controversial.3' While
it may never be possible to reach consensus on a definition, a general
picture is becoming clear. Domestic violence is more than one partner
hitting another. It is "a pattern of coercive behaviors ... perpetrated by
someone who is or was involved in an intimate relationship with the
victim. 3 2 The word "pattern," itself, raises many questions since many
patterns exist. Ultimately, therefore, a functional definition may be the
most useful: domestic violence is that combination of social, economic, and
26. Id.
27. For a comprehensive analysis of the effect of domestic violence on children, see
Weithorn, supra note 23.
28. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (2002) ("Advice couched in
narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considera-
tions ... are predominant.").
29. Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Minn. 1991).
30. A client, not a lawyer, sets the objectives of the representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
31. The Wyoming Domestic Violence Protection Act defines "domestic abuse" as "physical
abuse, threats of physical abuse or acts which unreasonably restrain the personal liberty
of any household member by any other household member." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21 -
102(a)(iii) (2001).
32. Am. MED. Ass'N, supra note 19, at 5.
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cultural factors and individual behaviors "by which a batterer forces an
intimate partner to 'live with a constant sense of danger and expectation of
violence."'33 "Pattern" also implies, of course, that the behaviors are
repeated, and they are. While women occasionally escape an abusive
relationship after one incident of violence, most are caught in a cycle of
recurrent and escalating abuse.34
Just as the combinations of social, economic, and cultural factors are
limitless, so, too, are the individual behaviors which a batterer may use to
control a victim. In addition to physical violence, such behaviors may in-
clude verbal abuse, imprisonment, humiliation, stalking, and denial of
access to financial resources, shelter, or services."
Domestic violence may occur at any point in a relationship. Generally,
however, the frequency and severity of the violence escalate over time. It is
commonly believed that the risk and amount of violence increase when a
relationship ends. 6 The NIJ/CDC study, however, indicates that "most
rapes and physical assaults occur in the context of an ongoing, rather than
terminated relationship."37 By contrast, stalking "is most likely to occur in
the context of a terminated relationship. . . ." 8 Whichever survey one ac-
cepts, however, it seems clear that at least some abusive behaviors increase
when a relationship ends. Since a victim often seeks legal assistance, such as
a protection order or a divorce, to help end a relationship, the time that a
woman consults a lawyer is often a time of increased risk for the women,
which corresponds to a heightened responsibility for the lawyer.3
As discussed earlier, domestic violence touches all strata of society.4" As
a result, no determinative factors or characteristics accurately indicate an
individual's propensity to become a victim or a batterer in a domestic
33. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note I, at iv.
34. AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 19, at 5.
35. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 5. The number and variety of controlling
behaviors is nearly limitless. Non-physical behaviors may include yelling, swearing,
name-calling, incessant criticism, economic coercion (withholding financial information,
rationing money, withholding necessary medical treatment for a woman or her children,
limiting the use of a vehicle or other assets), physical and/or emotional isolation
(preventing contact or communication with her friends or family), and changing the
rules without warning ("rules" such as when dinner is to be on the table or what is
acceptable housekeeping). See, e.g., DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 66-68.
36. See, e.g., TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note I, at 37.
37. Id. at 37-38.
38. Id. at 38.
39. In Roberts v. Healey, for example, the events which led to the death of the client's chil-
dren, and the subsequent suit against the lawyer who did not obtain an order of
protection, occurred when the woman was attempting to leave her batterer. Roberts v.
Healey, 991 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App. 1999).
40. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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violence situation." The absence of useful predictors means that lawyers, as
well as other persons who come into contact with victims, need to assume
that any individual woman is a victim until that possibility is eliminated
through appropriate screening, which will be discussed in Part IV.
42
1. Why Doesn't She Leave?
A victim's survival strategies often appear "maladaptive, illogical, and
unstable. "" Despite brutal abuse, a victim often remains in an abusive rela-
tionship, even though doing so may provide an opportunity for the batterer
to abuse further both the woman and their or her children. A victim may
use drugs or alcohol to cope with the situation, resulting in neglect of the
children, or she may deny or minimize the violence."
Staying with or returning to a batterer seems absurd at first glance. It
may, however, be a logical response to survive in a completely illogical
situation. Even if a woman wants to leave, at least three difficult hurdles
may prevent her from doing so. First, leaving generally increases a woman's
risk of being the victim of additional domestic violence.45 Second, many
women have no practical ability to support themselves or their children.46
After all, control of the family's finances is a common form of control exer-
cised by a batterer. 7 Third, a victim often believes a batterer's threats that
he will take the children, and she will never see them again."
41. See, e.g., DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 24; and Roberta L. Valente, Screening Guide-
lines, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 5,
at 2-3.
42. See infra notes 146-162 and accompanying text.
43. Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases, 34
FAM. L.Q. 43, 45 (2000).
44. Id.; see also Roberta L. Valente, Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law
Practitioner, 29 FAM. L.Q. 187, 191 (1995) (stating that "victims are more likely to
adopt their batterers' perception [s] ... to the point of minimizing or denying the abuse,
as a survival strategy.").
45. Deborah M. Goelman, Safety Planning, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 2-11.
46. See, e.g., DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 177-82.
47. See, e.g., TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 5.
48. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, A GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS: Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE 11. ("Frequently, perpetrators use threats about
the children to manipulate victims.").
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2. Why Does He Batter?
Just as more research is needed about victims of domestic violence,
much more research is needed about batterers. While there is much we do
not know, we do know that domestic violence grows out of a batterer's desire
for control. 9 The key inquiry is why such a desire exists. After all, the desire is
clearly one which the batterer can and does selectively control.50 Battering
appears to be a learned behavior. Men who were reared in homes with do-
mestic violence are more likely to become batterers than those who were not;
the correlation, however, is far from exact. Men who were exposed to violence
as children may not become batterers, and men who were not may.5' What-
ever the reason for the violence, a batterer often receives support, rather than
the condemnation he deserves. The CDC found, for example, that "[p]arents
and peers appear to play a role in supporting adolescent males' violence to-
ward dating partners."" It is not surprising, therefore, that "perhaps the most
pressing need for research involves the [reasons for the] development of this
[battering] behavior among partners .... 53
C Summary
The pervasiveness and magnitude of domestic violence are no longer
open to questions, though its precise parameters and causes are. The scope
of the problem makes it inevitable that a lawyer will encounter domestic
violence in some manifestation, regardless of the nature of a lawyer's prac-
tice (the nature of a law practice may make encountering domestic violence
more or less likely, but will not eliminate the possibility).
As a result of the severity and pervasiveness of domestic violence, every
lawyer has both an ethical54 and a legal55 duty to act as a reasonable lawyer
49. Id. See also DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 66-68; TJADEN & THOENNES, supra
note 1, at 5.
50. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 48, at 13 ("Stress... does
not cause batterers to abuse their partners ... if stress caused domestic violence, batterers
would assault their bosses or co-worker rather than their intimate partners. Domestic vio-
lence flourishes because perpetrators learn that they can achieve what they want through the
use of force...").
51. AM.MED. Ass'N, supra note 19, at 5.
52. Silverman et al., supra note 12, at 578.
53. Id.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002)("A lawyer shall provide competent rep-
resentation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
55. A malpractice action may be based in contract or negligence. The general standard of
care in a legal malpractice case is adapted from the "reasonable person" standard of tort
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under the circumstances. The questions, therefore, become: (1) what
should a reasonable lawyer know about domestic violence; (2) what should
a reasonable lawyer do to determine whether the lawyer's current or pro-
spective client is a victim or a batterer; and (3) what should a reasonable
lawyer do if the lawyer discovers that the current or prospective client is a
batterer or a victim. These questions are addressed in the third and fourth
parts of this article.
III. THE EFFECT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON LAW PRACTICE
Given the prevalence of domestic violence, it is likely that every lawyer
will encounter persons dealing with it during his or her career. 16 Neverthe-
less, many lawyers erroneously assume that domestic violence will only arise
in domestic relations cases, and since they have little or no involvement
with that area of law, domestic violence will never touch their practices.
That assumption is not simply wrong; it is a mistake which can have sig-
nificant consequences for both lawyer and client.
The simple and sad truth is that domestic violence is so pervasive that
virtually every lawyer will encounter domestic violence in his or her prac-
tice.57 Consider, for example, the estate planning lawyer who is asked to
prepare estate plans for each spouse; the real estate lawyer who represents a
couple in a property transaction; the business lawyer who represents a busi-
ness entity whose constituents include intimate partners; the tax lawyer
whose client had no idea that her spouse was not filing their joint tax re-
turns; or the lawyer whose secretary misses work or is unable to work
efficiently because of the effects of domestic violence. Given the pervasive-
ness of domestic violence, it is likely that a lawyer in general practice will
represent either a batterer or a victim. This part discusses how lawyers'
practices will be affected by domestic violence.
law. A lawyer must "handle the client's affairs with the degree of care and skill that
would have been exercised by a reasonable attorney acting in similar circumstances."
ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 301:101 (1993).
56. See, e.g., Roberta L. Valente, Domestic Violence and the Law, in THE IMPACT OF DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 1-3.
57. Roberta L. Valente, Domestic Violence and the Law, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 1-2. ("Lawyers in most areas of
practice have already had or will have a client who is a perpetrator of a victim of domes-
tic violence.").
20031
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER d' LAW
A. Why Lawyers Should Be Concerned
Rather than acknowledging and confronting disturbing problems, it is
easier and more pleasant to turn from them. And so it is tempting for law-
yers to turn from domestic violence, comfortable in their ignorance. Yet to
do so is morally indefensible and ethically and legally unreasonable. Law-
yers should be concerned about domestic violence and how it will touch
their lives and practices. Lawyers will encounter domestic violence in their
practices, whether they want to or expect to. When they do, they have both58
an ethical and a legal obligation, not to mention a moral one, to respond
reasonably. The story of Karin Roberts and Daniel Kennedy illustrates how
domestic violence can become a part of a lawyer's practice, whether wanted
or otherwise, and how a lawyer's failure to act reasonably can have dire con-
sequences.
Karin Roberts and Daniel Kennedy were married in 1991; their mar-
riage produced two daughters.59 During the marriage, Daniel became
progressively more volatile and more violent. By the fall of 1994, concerned
with Daniel's increasingly threatening and violent behavior, Karin con-
tacted a lawyer and asked him to file for a divorce and secure an order to
restrain Daniel from contacting or harming Karin. The lawyer filed a peti-
tion for divorce, along with an application for a restraining order. The
lawyer did not, however, take any further steps to obtain a signed protective
order, "despite repeated calls from Karin and her mother. '
Daniel's behavior became so disturbing that Karin moved to a new
apartment, with the two children, in an attempt to hide from her husband.
It didn't work. Daniel tracked her down and left a threatening note on the
apartment door. Frightened, Karin took the note to her lawyer's office. A
few days later, Daniel accosted Karin in the parking lot of her apartment
and forced her to take him to the apartment. He broke in, shot and killed
their two young daughters and wounded Karin's mother, before turning the
gun on himself.
Karin and her mother, Marjorie Roberts, sued Karin's lawyer for fail-
ing to obtain an order of protection, alleging negligence, gross negligence,
breach of contract, breach of warranty, violation of the Deceptive Trade
Practice Act (DTPA), and "bystander damages" (analogous to negligent
58. Morality has a clear role in the practice of law. "Many of a lawyer's professional respon-
sibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and
procedural law. However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience... MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (2002).
59. Roberts v. Healey, 991 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App. 1999).
60. Id.
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infliction of emotional distress).61 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the lawyer on all counts. On appeal, the Texas Court of
Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the lawyer on Karin's
claims of negligence, gross negligence, and DTPA, as well as her mother's
claims for negligence and gross negligence. The Court reversed summary
judgment, however, on Karin's claims for breach of contract and breach of
warranty, and on Marjorie's claims for violations of the DTPA, breach of
contract, breach of warranty, and the claim for bystander damages.62 The
case was subsequently settled.
Summary judgment was affirmed on the negligence claims because the
appellate court found that the lawyer's "failure to obtain a protective order
is too attenuated from [the husband's] criminal conduct to constitute a le-
gal cause of injury to Karin, her mother, and her children."63 Although the
lawyer "won" much of the battle, the losses his former client suffered were
extraordinary, and any lawyer outside of Texas who relies on the court's
rationale to absolve him or her of legal responsibility under such circum-
stances is taking a significant gamble. The court's analysis of causation is
problematic, at best. Another court could easily have gone the other way on
similar facts and using a similar analysis. And the absence of legal liability
does not eliminate the possibility of a grievance and, ultimately, a sanction
for breach of the lawyer's ethical responsibility to provide competent repre-
sentation. 64
As domestic violence assumes a higher profile in society at large and in
the legal community, in particular, it will become increasingly difficult for a
lawyer to argue successfully that he or she has neither a legal nor an ethical
responsibility to understand domestic violence and no obligation to take
reasonable precautions to minimize the potential harm to a client or others
involved in such violence. Lawyers who represent alleged batterers also need
to be aware of their potential responsibility to warn or take other steps to
minimize harm to non-clients.65
Lawyers are not the only ones being sued. Their clients are, too. Wal-
Mart, for example, was recently sued by an employee who was shot by her
husband shortly after he bought bullets at the store. The suit alleges that
the employee had recently obtained a restraining order against her husband,
61. Id. at 877.
62. Id. at 881-82.
63. Id. at 879.
64. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) ("A lawyer shall provide compe-
tent representation to a client.").
65. For a discussion of a lawyer's duty to warn, see Part V of this article, A Lawyer's Duty to
Warn, footnotes 163-246 and accompanying text.
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that Wal-Mart management knew about the order, and that it negligently
failed to take any steps to protect her." Wal-Mart's lawyers doubtlessly do
not consider themselves domestic relations lawyers; they likely are corporate
litigators. Yet they, too, need to understand domestic violence law in order
to represent properly a client who has become unintentionally involved in
domestic violence litigation.67
B. Lawyers for Victims
Not surprisingly, domestic violence will be a significant issue for vic-
tims in both civil and criminal matters. Therefore, it is necessarily a
significant issue for the lawyers who represent them.
1. Civil Matters
Knowing about domestic violence is no longer optional for lawyers
who practice domestic relations law. The failure to know about and inquire
into the possibility of domestic violence simply does not meet the ethical or
legal standard of care required for domestic relations lawyers. The reasons
are several.
First, a relatively new area of domestic relations law is representing a
person seeking a domestic violence protection order68 or a person seeking
judicial relief from a stalker.69 It should be self-evident that a lawyer who is
contacted by a woman seeking an order of protection or civil relief against a
stalker will need to be familiar with the dynamics of, and laws regarding,
domestic violence.
66. Shannon P. Duffy, Employee Sues Wal-Mart Because Store Didn t Protect Her From Husband'
Attack, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (August 24, 2001), at http://www.law.com/jsp/
statearchive.jsp?type=Artide&oldid=ZZZZE42V7RQC.
67. Seegenerally Roberta L. Valente, Domestic Violence and the Law, in THE IMPACT OF Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 5.
68. Until the mid- 1970s, restraining orders were generally only available as part of divorce
proceedings. Every state now has a statutory procedure which authorizes the issuance of
an order of protection to restrain a batterer from committing additional violence against
an intimate partner. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 498. The federal Violence
Against Women Act requires states to give full faith and credit to orders issued in other
jurisdictions. Id.
69. Stalking laws often provide an additional or alternative remedy in many states. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (West 2002); R.I. GEN LAws § 9-1-2.1 (2001); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 85.002 (Vernon 2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-126
(Michie 2001).
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One of the more important issues to discuss with a client seeking pro-
tection from a batterer or a stalker is whether obtaining a protective order
or other civil relief will actually protect the client, or whether doing so may
70
create more danger by inflaming the batterer. In either event, a lawyer's
failure to act promptly and properly may well lead to a malpractice suit, as
it did in the Healey case discussed above. 7' A lawyer who learns that a client
is in danger of domestic violence may also need to take steps beyond ob-
taining an order of protection or initiating some other legal proceedings.
The lawyer may need to assist the client in safety planning. 2 "[T]he danger
of violence, including the risk of death, escalates when a domestic violence
survivor attempts to leave a batterer. ''73 (It is also the most dangerous time
for the lawyer.) 74 Obtaining an order of protection may not actually protect
a victim since some batterers will not be deterred by a piece of paper and
may even be provoked to additional violence.75 In addition, or instead, a
lawyer should either advise the client about safety planning or refer her to
outside resources (safety planning is discussed in Part IV of this article).76
Fortunately, lawyers and their clients need not face the dangers and
difficulties of domestic violence alone; they can call on expert assistance
from an increasing number of resources. Many communities now have
domestic violence prevention programs, which can provide shelter and as-
sistance in safety planning. They may also have a coalition against domestic
violence and sexual assault, which can provide advice about representing
victims of domestic violence. Finally, the National Domestic Violence Hot-
line can be contacted at (800) 799-7233.
Second, the touchstone of child custody or visitation in virtually every
state is "the best interests of the child. ,77 Since it is now well established
that domestic violence against a child or witnessed by a child is extremely
detrimental to the child, domestic violence is critically important to child
70. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?
222 (1996).
71. See supra notes 39, 59-63 and accompanying text.
72. Safety is often the primary concern of a current client or prospective client who is a vic-
tim of domestic abuse. Safety planning is discussed in Part IV of this article.
73. Roberta L. Valente, Screening Guidelines, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 2-11.
74. The Family Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile And Family Court
Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal
Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197, 198 (1995) [hereinafter Family Violence Project].
75. The efficacy of orders of protection has been hotly debated. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA,
supra note 70, at 229.
76. See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
77. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 350-5 1.
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custody proceedings.78 Similarly, joint custody, a relatively recent legal phe-
nomenon designed to encourage the active participation of both parents in
their children's lives, may be inappropriate or even harmful where domestic
violence is involved. In these cases, joint custody is contrary to a child's best
79interests.
In the majority of states, statutes require courts to consider domestic
violence when determining the best interests of a child. 0 Often by statute a
court considering custody or visitation must consider evidence of domestic
violence as being contrary to the best interests of the child.' Since custody
determinations are a matter of state law, a finding of domestic violence will
have different consequences in different states.
Custody provisions in several states create rebuttable presumptions,
either against awarding custody to a batterer or against awarding joint
custody when domestic violence is involved. 2 Whether those schemes have
cured the problem of custody decrees paying too little heed to domestic
violence is not clear. It is clear, however, that lawyers need to be familiar
with the statutory and case law standards in their states which relate to
domestic violence. The same or similar standards generally apply inS 81
paternity cases involving custody or visitation. Statutes in other states may
simply require the court to consider domestic violence as a factor in
determining custody and visitation."
Whatever the custody standard, domestic relations practitioners need
to be conversant with the dynamics of domestic violence and its effects on
children so that the lawyers can help courts craft custody and visitation ar-
rangements which will promote the safety of all concerned and thereby
further the best interests of the children. That may include presenting ex-
pert testimony to help the court understand the need to treat cases
involving domestic violence differently than other custody cases."
78. Family Violence Project, supra note 74, at 198; see also Linda Elrod, Reforming the System
to Protect Children in High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REv. 495
(2001).
79. Family Violence Project, supra note 74, at 200.
80. Id. at 199-200.
81. Id. at 200; seeALA. CODE § 30-3-131 (2001); CAL. FAM. CODE § 303.1 (West 2002);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 24 0(l)(a) (McKinney2002);ARK. CODEANN. § 9-13-101(c)(1)
(Michie 2002).
82. Family Violence Project, supra note 74, at 208.
83. In reAdoption of R.S.C., 837 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1992).
84. See, e.g., Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 2 0-2-201(C) (Michic 2001). (The court "shall consider
evidence of spousal abuse or child abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the chil-
dren.").
85. Family Violence Project, supra note 74, at 209.
86. Id. at 213.
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Third, while mediation is now common in domestic relations cases in-
volving children, and required in some jurisdictions,87 mediation may not
be appropriate when the relationship is an abusive one. Victims' advocates
fear that mediation may: (1) remove cases involving domestic violence from
the public scrutiny of open judicial proceedings; (2) cause victims to com-
promise their legal rights to gain some measure of safety for themselves or
children; and (3) allow batterers to reassert control over victims."
Fourth, although many states are now so-called "no-fault" divorce
states, others are not. And even in those states where divorce is "no-fault,"
evidence of fault may still be relevant to other issues, such as the equitable
distribution of property and debts.89 Domestic violence is directly relevant
to the issue of fault. 90 Accordingly, evidence of domestic violence may be
both admissible and persuasive on issues other than custody and visitation.
Finally, domestic violence can easily give rise to a tort. The old com-
mon law view was that when a woman married, her legal identity merged
with her husband's; she could not sue him for a tort (or vice versa).9' The
old common law is changing rapidly. In those states where the issue of
spousal immunity has arisen, "state courts have usually abolished the im-
munity for intentional torts." 92 In those states which allow claims for inter-
spousal torts, potential claims for assault, battery, and now, intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, 93 need to be investigated and evaluated as part
87. Some states require mandatory mediation for custody cases. See NEV. REV. STAT.
% 3.475-3.500 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.179 (2001) (requiring mediation when
one party formally objects to joint custody). Other jurisdictions provide for a court to
order mediation without requiring it. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-602(a) (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.183(1) (West 2002). Still other jurisdictions provide for court ordered
mediation except when domestic violence is at issue: TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071
(Vernon 2002); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311 (West 2002); ALA. CODE § 6-6-20
(2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.7A (West 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-02
(2001).
88. Family Violence Project, supra note 74, at 219. No data is yet available on whether those
fears are justified. Id.
89. See, e.g., Grosskopfv. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 819 (Wyo. 1984) (Although the Wyo-
ming statutes on marriage dissolution have been amended since Grosskopf was decided,
the reference in Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-114 to the "merits" of the parties has not been
changed).
90. See, e.g., Monson v. Monson, 583 N.W.2d 825, 826 n.2 (N.D. Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]his
divorce is the fault of [Ronald] on the grounds of abuse, neglect, financial irresponsibil-
ity, dissipation of assets and adultery.").
91. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 279, at 751 (2000).
92. Id. at 753.
93. See also Bradley A. Case, Turning Marital Misery Into Financial Fortune: Assertion of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims by Divorcing Spouses, 33 U. LouISVILLE
J. FAM. L. 101, 115 (1995).
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of every divorce. While those claims may need to be asserted in another
action,94 a divorce lawyer needs to inquire into these issues and take appro-
priate action or refer the person to a lawyer who will.
In the area of domestic relations law, a lawyer's obligations are becom-
ing clear. A reasonable lawyer should know about the pervasiveness and
dynamics of domestic violence; inquire into the possibility and extent of
domestic violence in every divorce, paternity, or custody proceeding; use
information about domestic violence accordingly. "Only an informed at-
torney can argue the various innovative provisions in child custody laws
concerning family violence. Likewise, only an informed attorney can see the
relevance of family violence to the issue of child custody and can articulate
it well to the court."95 A lawyer who fails to take reasonable steps to learn if
domestic violence is occurring, and use the information for the client's
benefit, will have failed to act as a reasonable lawyer under the circum-
stances, a violation of a lawyer's legal96 and ethical97 duties.
Although domestic violence will be an important issue in many do-
mestic relations cases, domestic violence can, and will, affect all areas of civil
practice. It is common, for example, for an estate planning lawyer to be
asked to represent a husband and a wife in performing joint estate plan-
ning. Potential conflicts of interest are inherent in every such situation,
regardless of the possibility of domestic violence. A lawyer asked to repre-
sent multiple clients with potentially differing interests must always
consider the appropriateness of obtaining waivers from each of the clients
and obtain them properly.98
Whenever a lawyer is asked to represent multiple parties, the lawyer is
well advised to meet with each prospective client separately. Such a meeting
with an individual often yields very different results from a joint meeting.
Such a meeting is the ideal time to screen for domestic violence. If it turns
out that one party has assumed control of the other through violence or by
other means, an attorney asked to represent both spouses needs to be aware
of that control and consider whether it is permissible to continue with joint
representation. It likely will not be.
94. Id. at 114-15.
95. Family Violence Project, supra note 74, at 222.
96. See CATHERINE PALO, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL
ABUSE § 8.17B (Supp.2002) ("[A] ttorney malpractice regarding the negligent handling
of a domestic tort cause of action is a natural extension of the proliferation of tort claims
arising out of divorce cases and family disputes.").
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
98. For a discussion of the general standards for such conflicts of interest, see ABA/BNA
LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §§ 51.301-16 (1993).
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If individual meetings disclose domestic violence, the lawyer likely has
a duty to decline the representation because of the actual or potential con-
flict of interest.99 The lawyer should not, however, simply inform the
prospective clients that he or she must decline the representation because of
a conflict of interest. The reason is that doing so likely will alert the batterer
that the victim disclosed something to the lawyer. Simply declining repre-
sentation is not appropriate because a lawyer owes duties to a prospective
client, even though the lawyer and the prospective client never form an at-
torney-client relationship.'00 Foremost among them is the duty of
confidentiality. A lawyer "shall not use or reveal information learned in the
consultation" with the prospective client.'0 ' A lawyer may not, therefore,
disclose to one spouse what the other spouse said, i.e., that she said she is
the victim of domestic violence. Further, the lawyer should assist the victimI .102 with103
in assessing lethality, consult with the victim about safety planning, or
refer her to someone who will. It is not reasonable to do otherwise.
Joint estate planning is just one example of how domestic violence can
profoundly affect a lawyer's representation in an area of the law other than
domestic relations. The possible scenarios where one intimate partner effec-
tively controls the other are endless and should be a concern in any case
where a lawyer is asked to represent clients jointly. As part of the lawyer's
conflict screening with each prospective client, the issue of control through
domestic violence can and should be determined and evaluated. If domestic
violence has occurred or is occurring, a lawyer cannot ethically represent
both parties.
Domestic violence may be an issue in cases which do not involve joint
representation. In a tax case, for example, in which a wife was relying on
her husband to file a joint tax return, and the return was not correct, the
wife may seek to avoid tax liability on the basis that "she did not know of,
99. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2002).
100. "Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the
client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so.
But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, thatattach when
the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. See
Rule 1.18." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002) (emphasis added); see also
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990) (Protec-
tion of Information Imparted by Prospective Client) ("Information imparted to a lawyer
by a would-be client seeking legal representation is protected from revelation or use by
Model Rule 1.6 even though the lawyer does not undertake representation...").
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(b) (2002); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358, supra note 100.
102. See infra note 159 and accompanying text for a discussion of assessing lethality.
103. See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
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and had no reason to know of. . ." the representations in the return. ' A
woman who has been the victim of domestic violence may be the quintes-
sential innocent spouse. The lawyer needs to know, therefore, whether
domestic violence has occurred and, if so, be able to use that information to
the client's benefit.
2. Criminal Matters
A victim of domestic violence may resort to violence against a batterer
to protect herself and/or her children from further violence. Such actions
may lead to criminal charges against the victim. The obvious defense in
such cases is self-defense. As a general matter, self-defense is predicated on
the individual having an imminent fear of death or substantial bodily
harm.'O5 In the past, traditional concepts of imminence were often not pre-
sent in cases of domestic violence since the victim's actions against the
batterer may have come at a time when the batterer was not actively en-
gaged in physical violence. The victim's conduct, however, may have been
reasonable given her circumstances. Fortunately, courts in most jurisdic-
tions have now held that victims of domestic violence can establish
imminent fear."6
Evidence about battering and its effects"0 7 on a woman is now often a
critical element of a legal defense of self-defense." The lawyer who raises
the affirmative defense of self-defense arising out of domestic violence must
generally introduce expert testimony that the woman suffered from
battering and its effects in order to establish the necessary belief of a
104. See 26 U.S.C. § 66(c)(1) (2002).
105. See Hernandez v. State, 976 P.2d 672 (Wyo. 1999).
106. See John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination of Reasonableness of
Criminal Defendant's Belief for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, that Physical Force is Neces-
sary--Modern Cases, 73 A.L.R. 4th 993 (1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06
(Anderson 2002); State v. Hendrickson, 914 P.2d 1194 (1996).
107. The phrase "battered woman's syndrome" was, and is still, often used to describe batter-
ing and its effects. A consensus has emerged, however, that the phrase "does not
adequately reflect the breadth or nature of the empirical knowledge about battering and
its effects." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NAT'L INST. OF JUS-
TICE, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT vii (May 1996)[hereinafter REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION
40506]. As an alternative, the phrase "battering and its effects" more accurately describes
the body of scientific and clinical knowledge on which appropriate expert testimony is
based. Id. at xii.
108. Id. at iii-xiv. See also Michelle Michelsen, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony On Bat-
teringAnd Its Effects After Kumho Tire, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 367 (2001).
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reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm.° 9 Expert testimony
can "provide relevant information important to the fact finders for purposes
of their deliberations in a criminal case involving battered women." 0 Such
evidence cannot only help educate the judge and the jury about domestic
violence, it may well be critical to representing adequately a criminal
defendant. Expert testimony about battering and its effects has been
admitted in all fifty states and in the District of Columbia.' Accordingly, a
criminal defense lawyer must understand the dynamics of domestic violence
and consult appropriate experts to defend properly a client who has struck
out at a barterer.
Knowing about and understanding domestic violence is not just a mat-
ter of fulfilling a criminal defense lawyer's ethical and legal duties to act as a
reasonable lawyer; it has constitutional overtones. The failure to present
evidence to support a claim of self-defense based on battering and its effects
in an appropriate case may be a deprivation of a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Under the Sixth Amendment, representation in a criminal matter is
ineffective if "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result."" 2 This standard requires the defendant to show two things:
(1) that "counsel's performance was deficient;" and (2) that the deficient
performance "prejudiced the defense."" State constitutions generally con-
tain a similar requirement."' The failure to properly raise and pursue a
defense involving domestic violence may be constitutionally deficient.
Debra and Terrance Romero were charged with and convicted of sec-
ond degree robbery and four counts of attempted robbery." 5 Debra
admitted her involvement in the crimes but claimed that her participation
had been under duress; she was afraid that Terrance would kill her if she
109. See Anna Farber Conrad, The Use of Victim Advocates and Expert Witnesses in Battered
Women Cases, CoLo. LAw., December 2001, at 43.
110. See REPoRT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40506, supra note 107, at ix.
111. Id.
112. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
113. Id. at 687.
114. See The REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40506, supra note 107, at vii.
115. See People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), rev'don other
grounds, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994) (Court of Appeal lacked authority for its grant of re-
lief on contested habeas corpus petition without issuing writ of habeas corpus or order to
show cause.. .); see also United States v. Nelson, 966 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (D. Kan.
1997) (Not ineffective assistance where defense attorney knew about battered woman's
syndrome and elected not to raise the issue).
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did not help him. "6 After her conviction, she sought post-conviction relief,
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because her lawyer had not pre-
sented expert testimony about battered woman's syndrome (BWS)"' to
corroborate the duress defense."" After an extensive review of the literature
and law on battered woman's syndrome, the California Court of Appeals
agreed with Ms. Romero that "there is a reasonable probability that presen-
tation of expert testimony about BWS would have bolstered her credibility
and persuaded the jury to accept the defense of duress.' '1. Such expert tes-
timony, concluded the court, "would have explained a behavior pattern that
might otherwise (and obviously did) appear unreasonable to the jurors."'2
In short, the reasonable criminal defense lawyer knows about and un-
derstands battering and its effects so that if appropriate, it can be
investigated and raised at trial. A lawyer who fails to do so will have failed
ethically, legally, and constitutionally.
Prosecutors, too, need to be able to address domestic violence issues. It
may be important, for example, for a prosecutor to help a jury understand
why a woman who has been repeatedly assaulted remains in an abusive rela-
tionship and why her doing so is not a defense to additional criminal
assault(s).
In Trujillo v. State, ' a male defendant was convicted of aggravated as-
sault and battery on his female partner. The trial court permitted the state
to present evidence about the defendant's prior assaultive behavior and al-
lowed an expert to testify that the victim's behavior was similar to persons
with "Hostage Syndrome and Battered Woman Syndrome., 2 On appeal,
the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the trial court's rulings.
23
C. Lawyers for Batterers
Lawyers for batterers have similar responsibilities to lawyers for vic-
tims. Both need to be conversant with domestic violence and its effects.
116. See Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
117. As noted above, a consensus has emerged that the phrase battered woman's syndrome
"does not adequately reflect the breadth or nature of the empirical knowledge about bat-
tering and its effects." See supra note 107.
118. See Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335.
119. Id. at 340.
120. Id. at 341. The failure to raise a defense of the effects of battering has arisen in very few
cases. It is, therefore, impossible to predict whether that failure will lead to successful ar-
guments that a lawyer has failed to provide effective assistance.
121. Trujillo v. State, 953 P.2d 1182 (Wyo. 1998).
122. Id. at 1185.
123. Id. at 1187.
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Many of the same issues will arise. Just as a lawyer for a victim must repre-
sent his or her client reasonably, so, too, must a lawyer for a barterer. Both
lawyers will need to know about and understand domestic violence to dis-
charge properly that ethical and legal responsibility.
Just as a lawyer for a woman seeking a protection order or civil relief
from a stalker must be familiar with domestic violence, so, too, must the
lawyer for the alleged batterer or stalker. The consequences of having a pro-
tective order entered against a client have become potentially significant-
federal law restricts the transfer, transportation, and ownership of firearms
by a person who has been found guilty of domestic violence 2 or a person
who is the subject of an order of protection, even if there is no finding that
domestic violence has occurred).' 25 A lawyer for an alleged barterer must be
familiar with the potential consequences and advise the client accordingly.
As discussed above, domestic violence is often a mandatory considera-
tion in a child custody case.2 6 The lawyer for the batterer must, therefore,
be prepared to rebut or at least minimize such allegations and evidence.
The lawyer should also advise a batterer about the consequences of domes-
tic violence on the children.
124. Under federal law:
It shall be unlawful for any person.., who has been convicted in any court of
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or
foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or am-
munition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)(9) (1996). The United States District Court for the District of Ne-
braska and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have found
the statute unconstitutional in part. United States v. Ficke, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075
(D.Neb. 1999); FOP v. United States, 332 U.S. App. D.C. 49, 152 F.3d 998, 1004
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
125. The federal law restrictions on the transportation and possession of firearms also apply to
any person:
who is subject to a court order that-(A) was issued after a hearing of which
such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportu-
nity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or
threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate part-
ner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate
partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i)
includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical
safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such inti-
mate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily
injury.
18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g)(8) (1994).
126. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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Before a lawyer "zealously assert[s]" the client's position, a lawyer must
be an advisor, and "provide[] a client with an informed understanding of
the client's legal rights and obligations .... ,, The reason for acting first as
an advisor is that the client, not the lawyer, shall determine "the objectives
of representation...",1s Accordingly, a lawyer's advice must be "candid...
[and] a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation." 2' The rule clearly emphasizes a client's need for practical
advice: "Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a
client, especially where practical considerations, such as... effects on other
people, are predominant."' "0 It is hard to imagine a situation where the po-
tential effect on other people, the children, will be greater than when a
batterer wishes to have custody of or visitation with children who have been
exposed to domestic violence. Similarly, the American Academy of Matri-
monial Lawyers recommends that a lawyer who represents a parent in a
divorce case "advise the client of the potential effect of the client's conduct
on a child custody dispute."'
' 31
With the abrogation of inter-spousal immunity in many states, and the
concomitant possibility of claims for assault, battery, and/or intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising out of a dysfunctional marriage, all
divorce lawyers need to be aware of and advise their clients of potential
claims and defenses. It may be appropriate to seek a global resolution of
such claims as part of the divorce settlement. A lawyer for a batterer who
fails to inform the client of potential tort claims, and who fails to address
them properly when requested, may well have fallen short of acting as a
reasonable lawyer.
A lawyer who is asked to prepare a pre-nuptial agreement needs to be
sensitive to the possibility of domestic violence and its potential effect on
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (2002).
128. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (noting that although the lawyer then has
ultimate control over the means to be used to obtain those objectives, the lawyer is re-
quired to "consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (a)(2).
129. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1.
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 2. The permissive discussion of "non-
legal considerations" may become mandatory under the requirement that a lawyer "ex-
plain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b).
Providing an adequate explanation may well require discussing the effects of domestic
violence on the child(ren) of a batterer.
131. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Bounds ofAdvocacy: Goalsfor Family Lawyers,
at http://www.aaml.org/Bounds%20of%/20Advocacy/Bounds%20of/o20Advocacy.htm
(November 2000).
132. See supra notes 124 through 131 and accompanying text.
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the enforceability of such an agreement. The failure to do so can lead to
adverse consequences for all concerned. Drafting a pre-nuptial agreement,
which benefits one party, generally the lawyer's long-time client, at the ex-
pense of the other is asking for trouble. If the agreement is ultimately
voided, the lawyer has benefited no one. The lawyer has, in fact, harmed his
or her client by failing to draft a reasonable agreement and failing to advise
the client of the potential that an agreement may not survive. The lawyer
who drafts such an agreement and does not know of the nature of the rela-
tionship between the parties is not acting reasonably. The following case
illustrates the potential impact of domestic violence on pre-nuptial agree-
ments.
A lawyer in Washington State had represented James Foran and his
business for years. 33 James asked the lawyer to prepare a prenuptial agree-
ment that he and his soon-to-be wife Peggy could sign. The lawyer did so,
drafting an agreement that ensured that James would remain a wealthy man
and that Peggy would get virtually nothing if they divorced. James and
Peggy went to the lawyer's office the day before their planned trip to Las
Vegas to be married. The lawyer notified Peggy, in writing, that he repre-
sented James, and that she should consult independent counsel. Peggy
elected not to do so and signed the agreement.
During the Foran marriage, "episodes of domestic violence escalated,
both in frequency and severity."134 Peggy ultimately sought a divorce and
asked the court to set aside the prenuptial agreement. The Washington
Court of Appeals voided the agreement, holding that Peggy had neither
been given enough time to seek independent counsel nor an adequate ex-
planation of why she should do so. 35 The court explained: "That which is
obvious to attorneys and judges may not be obvious to the unrepresented
and economically subservient party."' 36 This contravenes the purpose of
independent counsel, which is to help "the subservient party to negotiate an
economically fair contract."'37 Since domestic violence is ultimately all
about control, 38 a lawyer asked to draft a prenuptial agreement needs to
avoid taking advantage of a subservient party. Not doing so runs the risk of
having the agreement thrown out, a result which benefits neither the client
133. In re Marriage of Foran, 834 P.2d 1081,1084 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1090.
136. Id. at 1088.
137. Id. at 1089.
138. See, e.g., Christopher L. Griffin, Real Men Take Responsibility for Domestic Violence, in
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 1-8;
TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 5.
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nor the lawyer, and which opens the lawyer to a grievance and/or a mal-
practice claim by a dissatisfied client.
A lawyer for a batterer may learn that his or her client intends to con-
tinue to batter his victim. The question which then arises is whether the
lawyer has a duty to warn the potential victim. A lawyer's duty to warn is a
complex and uncertain issue which is discussed in detail in Part IV of this
article. 39 If such a duty exists, it exists when a lawyer reasonably believes
that the client intends to commit a serious crime which will result in serious
bodily harm to a specific, identifiable victim. In a battering relationship, the
identity of the potential victim is usually well-known. The question is
whether the lawyer has a reasonable belief that the client intends to harm
the victim. If so, the lawyer probably has a duty to warn. The reason for
saying probably is that no court has ever held that a lawyer has a duty to
warn, other than in very narrow contexts. 4 0 Courts have, however, consid-
ered the issue in a variety of professional relationships, notably mental
health therapist-patient, 4 ' and have found a duty to warn when the profes-
sional has a reasonable belief that the patient intends to commit a crime
that will cause serious harm to a specific, identifiable victim. It is not un-
common for a married couple jointly to approach a lawyer and ask that he
or she draft the agreement, which they have already reached. Sadly, some
lawyers undertake to do just that, despite the obvious conflict of interest
which arises from representing two parties with directly adverse interests."'
Although the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct formerly con-
tained a narrow exception, and the rules in many states still do, which
arguably allows such representation, the conditions described in the rule
will almost never exist, and lawyers are better off simply to not undertake
such conflict-ridden tasks. "' The potential conflict of interest is so enor-
mous and so obvious that the reasonable lawyer never agrees to draft a
139. See infra notes 163-246 and accompanying text.
140. See infra Part V.
141. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
142. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct generally prohibit the representation of
parties with adverse interests. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2002).
143. The ethical window was Rule 2.2, lawyer as intermediary. This rule permitted a lawyer
to act as an intermediary between clients provided certain conditions were met. How-
ever, these conditions will almost never exist. In its recent amendments to the model
rules, the ABA's House of Delegates repealed Rule 2.2. The vote was based on the rec-
ommendation of the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Repeal was recommended because "the Committee is convinced that neither
the concept of 'intermediation' . . . nor the relationship between Rules 2.2 and 1.7 [re-
lating to conflicts of interest] are well understood." ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF
THE RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT, R. 2.2, Reporter's Explanation of Changes (1999). It
will be some time before states modify their rules to conform to the amendments of the
Model Rules.
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settlement agreement for a soon-to-be-divorced couple."' All the problems
that arise with respect to pre-nuptial agreements arise in this context as
well. The only way to avoid them is just to say no to joint representation in
domestic relations cases. Just saying no to joint representation is also in ac-
cord with the recommendations of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers. 45
D. Summary
Domestic violence has always been a pervasive problem. Not surpris-
ingly, persons involved in a violent relationship have legal problems among
their myriad problems. The pervasive nature of domestic violence and its
unique dynamics impose obligations on lawyers.
Fifteen or twenty years ago, a lawyer could reasonably assert that "I
don't know or care about domestic violence, I don't want to know or care
about it, and I don't need to." Today, such an assertion would be both
ethically and legally unreasonable. Today, the reasonable lawyer may no
longer remain ignorant of domestic violence and its effects on the lawyer's
practice. The reasonable lawyer knows or is willing to learn about domestic
violence and its potential effect on a client's legal issues, and then the lawyer
has a choice. The lawyer either knows how to use that knowledge to further
his or her client's interests, or the lawyer will refer the individual to a lawyer
who does.
In order to fulfill the responsibility to act reasonably, a lawyer should
screen prospective clients to determine if they are involved in domestic vio-
lence. Only with that information can the lawyer represent clients
effectively or refer them to lawyers who can. Part IV of this article discusses
144. NewABA Model Rule 1.7(b)(3) says that "[n]otwithstanding the existence of a concur-
rent conflict of interest ... a lawyer may represent a client if... the representation does
not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by
the lawyer in the same litigation .... Since a divorce always involves the assertion of
claims by one spouse against the other in the same litigation, lawyers should not under-
take joint representation of divorcing spouses. Comment 7 to the previous rules, versions
of which are in effect in 46 jurisdictions, says "[p]aragraph (a) [of Rule 1.7] prohibits
representation of opposing parties in litigation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.7(b)(3) cmt. 7 (2002).
145. The Academy's Bounds of Advocacy states that: "An attorney should not represent both
husband and wife even if they do not wish to obtain independent representation."
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Bounds of Advocacy: Goals for Family
Lawyers, § 3.1 at http://www.aaml.org/Bounds%20of°/o2OAdvocacy/Bounds%20ofO/
20Advocacy.htm (November 2000).
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how to screen clients for domestic violence and what steps to take if that
screening discloses the threat of future violence.
IV. SCREENING FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND SAFETY PLANNING
Not only is it important for lawyers to know about domestic violence
and how it will affect their practices, it is important for lawyers to know if
their clients are or have been the victims of such violence. Knowing the cli-
ent's experiences with domestic violence will, or at least should,
significantly alter the lawyer's representation. This Part provides recom-
mendations about how to screen prospective clients for domestic violence,
how to assess the risk of additional violence, and how to develop safety
plans for those clients who are determined to be at risk of additional vio-
lence.
A. Screening for Domestic Violence
The best, and easiest, way for lawyers to determine if prospective cli-
ents are involved in domestic violence is to screen their clients. In this
regard, the legal profession can borrow heavily from the medical profession.
For, just as a physician may be a victim's first contact outside a violent rela-
tionship, so, too, may a lawyer. To determine if prospective clients are
involved in domestic violence, lawyers can follow the recommendations of
the American Medical Association to doctors regarding their new pa-
tients-ask them.
146
While many victims who should seek medical attention do not, so
many do that the AMA has issued a pamphlet for physicians entitled "Di-
agnostic and Treatment Guidelines."'47 Among the guidelines is a
recommendation that physicians routinely screen all female patients for
domestic violence." 8 In addition to the health reasons for doing so, the
AMA suggests that physicians have a legal obligation to screen patients. A
physician, says the AMA, may have a duty to warn a potential victim of
domestic violence."' The failure to do so, concludes the AMvA, may lead to
medical malpractice lawsuits.150 The authors of a study about the prevalence
146. See AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 19, at 8.
147. SeeAM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 19.
148. Id. at 8.
149. Id. at 18.
150. Id. at 19.
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of dating violence amongst adolescent girls make a similar recommenda-
tion: "[m]edical and mental health professionals should routinely screen
adolescent girls for dating violence ... Likewise, lawyers should have a
similar responsibility.
Screening all potential clients does not place a significant burden on
lawyers. After all, lawyers generally screen prospective clients for a variety of
purposes. A lawyer needs to determine if the prospective client: (1) has a
case the lawyer wants (or will take); (2) can pay; (3) is already represented
by counsel, or (4) has interests which will create an actual or potential
conflict of interests which will preclude representation. Questions to screen
for domestic violence can easily be integrated into the existing screening
process.
A victim of domestic violence, or a batterer, is unlikely to identify her-
self or himself as such unless asked directly, even if the violence is a primary
factor in seeking legal assistance. 12 Since knowledge of the existence of a
violent relationship is critical to competent representation, and since the
prospective client is unlikely to disclose voluntarily the necessary informa-
tion, it becomes incumbent upon the lawyer to take the initiative to
discover pertinent client experiences with domestic violence.
A common reaction to suggesting that lawyers screen for domestic vio-
lence is that to do so will involve asking embarrassing and intrusive
questions. While there may be some initial embarrassment, victims are gen-
erally relieved when the issue is on the table, particularly if they have been
properly notified of the confidential relationship which exists between a
lawyer and a client. Some discomfort in asking questions about domestic
violence, however, is insignificant when compared with learning later that
the failure to screen has led to improper representation, which, in turn,
may have contributed to the injury or death of a client. That, of course,
could lead to a grievance or a malpractice suit."'
151. Silverman et al., supra note 12, at 578.
152. Roberta L. Valente, Screening Guidelines, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, 2-1 (Deborah M. Goelman, et al. eds., American Bar Associa-
tion Commission on Domestic Violence 1996).
153. See, e.g., Roberts v. Healey, 991 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App. 1999), reh. denied. See
discussion of Roberts v. Healey, supra Part III.
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B. Screening Questions
As discussed above, awareness of the extent and pervasiveness of do-
mestic violence has risen significantly in recent years."' Awareness of the
impact of domestic violence on law and law practice has risen too.1" In re-
sponse to the growing awareness of the impact of domestic violence on law
and law practice, the ABA has established a commission on domestic vio-
lence. The Commission has drafted guidelines to help lawyers address
domestic violence issues arising in their legal practice. The American Bar
Association's Commission on Domestic Violence recommends that lawyers
screen all clients. The commission's recommended screening guidelines,
with minor modifications, follow:'56
To represent clients effectively, 1157 need to know about all of the issues
which impact their cases. For this reason, I routinely ask the following
questions:
* Everyone argues or fights with his or her partner or spouse
now and then. When you argue or fight at home, what hap-
pens? Do you ever change your behavior because you are
afraid of the consequences of a fight?
* Do you feel that your partner or spouse treats you well? Is
there anything that goes on at home that makes you feel
afraid?
Has your partner or spouse ever hurt or threatened you or
your children? Has your partner or spouse ever put his or
her hands on you against your will? Has your partner or
spouse ever forced you to do something you did not want to
do? Does your partner or spouse criticize you or your chil-
dren often?
* Has your partner or spouse ever tried to keep you from tak-
ing medication you needed or from seeking medical help?
Does your partner refuse to let you sleep at night?
* Has your partner or spouse ever hurt your pets or destroyed
your clothing, objects in your home, or something which
you especially cared about? Does your partner or spouse
154. See supra Part I.
155. See supra Part Ii.
156. Valente, supra note 152, at 2-1.
157. The guidelines are written in the first person, as if a lawyer were actually screening a
client with them.
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throw or break objects in the home or damage the home it-
self during arguments?
• Does your partner or spouse act jealously, for example, al-
ways calling you at work or home to check up on you? Is it
hard for you to maintain relationships with your friends,
relatives, neighbors, or co-workers because your partner or
spouse disapproves of, argues with, or criticizes them? Does
your partner or spouse accuse you of flirting with others or
having affairs?
• Has your partner or spouse ever tried to keep you from leav-
ing the house?
* Does your spouse or partner make it hard for you to find or
keep a job or go to school?
* Every family has its own way of handling finances. Does
your partner or spouse withhold money from you when you
need it? Do you know what your family's assets are? Do you
know where important documents like bankbooks, check-
books, financial statements, birth certificates, and passports
for you and members of your family are kept? If you wanted
to see or use any of them, would your partner or spouse
make it difficult for you to do so? Does your spouse or part-
ner sometimes spend large sums of money and refuse to tell
you why or what the money was spent on?
• Has your spouse or partner ever forced you to have sex or
made you do things during sex that make you feel uncom-
fortable? Does your partner demand sex when you are sick,
tired, or sleeping?
* Has your spouse or partner ever used or threatened to use a
weapon against you? Are there guns in your home?
• Does your spouse or partner abuse drugs or alcohol? What
happens?
A client who answers "yes" to any one or even more than one question
may not be a victim of domestic violence. Rather, the lawyer needs to
consider the answers collectively and follow-up when appropriate. A lawyer
who is uncertain whether the answers suggest domestic violence should
consult someone with appropriate expertise."' If the answers to the
158. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 4 (2002) ("Matters that go beyond
strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters
can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical
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screening questions indicate domestic violence has occurred or is occurring,
the lawyer and the client need to assess the degree of risk of future violence.
C Assessing Lethality
The American Judges Foundation has developed "lethality factors" to
assist lawyers and clients in attempting to assess the risk of future violence.
With minor modifications, those factors appear below.' 5' Going through
the factors with a client is not only a good method of evaluating the client's
risk, but it often serves as a useful device to help her understand the risk.
While it is impossible to predict with certainty what a batterer will do,
the presence of even some of the following lethality factors can signal the
need for extra safety precautions. The more of these factors that are present,
the greater the danger.
• The victim (who is familiar with the batterer's behavior) be-
lieves the batterer's threats may be lethal.
* The batterer threatens to kill the victim or someone else.
* The batterer threatens or attempts suicide.
* The batterer has or has access to weapons and/or the batterer
has a history of using weapons.
* The domestic violence has involved strangling, choking, or
biting the victim.
* The batterer has easy access to the victim or the victim's
family.
* The couple has a history of prior calls to the police for help.
* The batterer is stalking the victim
* The batterer is jealous and possessive, or imagines the victim
is having affairs with others.
* The batterer is preoccupied or obsessed with the victim.
* The batterer is isolated from others (This is especially impor-
tant in rural areas, when the victim is central to the batterer's
life).
psychology or social work .... Where consultation with a professional in another field is
itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a
recommendation.").
159. NANCY L. RYGWELSKI, BEYOND HE SAID/ SHE SAID 49-52 (1995). See also WALKER ET
AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE COURTROOM: UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM,
KNOWING THE VICTIM 4 (1995); THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL
PRACTICE, supra note 5.
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* The batterer is assaultive during sex.
" The batterer makes threats to the victim's children.
" The batterer threatens to take the victim hostage, or has a
history of hostage-taking.
* The severity or frequency of violence has escalated.
• The batterer is depressed or paranoid.
* The batterer or victim has a psychiatric impairment.
• The batterer has experienced recent deaths or losses.
" The batterer was beaten as a child, or witnessed domestic
violence as a child.
* The batterer has killed or mutilated a pet, or threatened to
do so.
" The batterer has started taking more risks, or is "breaking
the rules" for using violence in the relationship (e.g., after
years of abuse committed only in the privacy of the home,
the batterer suddenly begins to behave abusively in public
settings).
* The batterer has a history of assaultive behavior against oth-
ers.
* The batterer has a history of defying court orders and the
judicial system.
• The victim has begun a new relationship.
• The batterer has problems with drug or alcohol use, or as-
saults the victim while intoxicated or "high."
The presence of even several of the above factors suggests the need to
take steps to develop a practical plan to protect a victim beyond simply ob-
taining an order of protection which a batterer may ignore, and which may
even provoke him.
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D. Safety Planning Guidelines 6 11
If screening and evaluating lethality disclose the threat of continued
violence, a reasonable lawyer will advise the client of the need to take steps
to ensure the client's safety and either refer the client to someone who will
assist with safety planning (such as a domestic violence programs) or ac-
tively assist the client in such planning. Some of the suggested steps involve
primarily the lawyer's conduct; some are directed more at the client's con-
duct.
A lawyer may need to take precautions when contacting a client. The
mere fact that a victim has contacted a lawyer will likely increase the possi-
bility of violence.'61 A typical, innocent action by a lawyer, such as sending
a client a letter in an envelope with the lawyer's return address, or making a
telephone call to someone with caller ID, or leaving a message on an an-
swering machine, may disclose a lawyer's involvement and precipitate
violence. It is important, therefore, for a lawyer to ask a client if it is safe to
send mail or make calls before doing so. If it is not, a lawyer should discuss
a safe place to send mail or make calls. A lawyer should always keep client
information confidential. It is doubly important when the client may be
harmed by its disclosure.
A lawyer needs to give a victim advance notice of expected develop-
ments. If, for example, a barterer is going to be served with legal
documents, an event which often provokes a batterer, the client needs to be
aware of when and where that is likely to happen so the client can take
steps to be in a safe place.
As a lawyer, you should either meet and accompany the client to court
or be sure to arrive there early so she does not have to confront her batterer
alone. At the conclusion of the hearing, ask the court to let her leave first so
he cannot follow her. If that doesn't work, leave with her. If the lethality
checklist indicates a high risk, notify the court and arrange to have an
armed peace officer present. When in court, do not let a batterer speak to
160. This section is based, in significant part, on the Safety Planning Checklist developed by
the American Bar Association's Commission on Domestic Violence. THE IMI'ACT OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 2-16. See also NAT'L
COUNCIL OF DOMESTIC AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND
FAMILY VIOLENCE § 405 (1994).
161. An attempt to end a batterer's control by leaving or taking steps to leave a relationship
may result in an escalation of abuse. Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the
Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 146 SMU L. REv. 2117 (1993), excerpted
in DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 64 ("[t]he victim's attempt to end the rela-
tionship does not mean that the control and comination will end; indeed, it may
escalate.").
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your client-unless he is appearing pro se in which case he will be entitled to
cross-examine her. In that event, there will be plenty of opportunities to
object. Do so, and do so frequently.
It is also important that you discuss with your client increasing the
safety of your client's home. If she and the batterer have lived together and
he has keys, have the locks changed (financial assistance for doing so may
be available from local domestic violence programs). Plan escape routes.
Make sure she has a locked room to which she can retreat and where a cell
phone has been hidden so she can call for help (cell phones programmed to
call 911 are often available at no charge from domestic violence programs).
Don't rely on regular telephones as ripping a phone out of the wall is a
common occurrence.
Have your client show a picture of the batterer and describe his car to
neighbors or co-workers and ask them to call law enforcement if he appears.
Since the home can never be really safe, discuss seeking shelter from a do-
mestic violence program or staying with friends or relatives.
The client should keep a bag packed and stored at another location, so
a quick exit can be made. The bag should include important documents, as
well as some clothing and other necessities for the client and her children.
Your client should also have extra, certified copies of protection or
stalking orders available at the client's home and at work. Law enforcement
personnel generally will not act unless presented with a certified copy of an
order. Make sure your client understands the difference and the impor-
tance.
Most of us follow predictable routines. Have your client vary hers and
take a different route to work, or leave at a different time. If possible, have
her travel with a different person in a different car.
Have the client screen incoming telephone calls and document them,
as well as any other suspicious activities. It will be critical to show a "course
of conduct," for example, to obtain a stalking order.'62
Screening prospective clients will always be a function of the lawyer or
the lawyer's staff. If screening discloses concerns about domestic violence,
assessing the potential lethality, safety planning, or both, is not necessarily a
lawyer's responsibility, though the lawyer may choose to undertake that
responsibility. A lawyer may, instead, discharge his or her responsibility by
referring the potential victim to one or more of the many resources which
are now available to assist victims of domestic violence. Most communities
162. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(a)(i)(Michie 2001) (A "course of conduct" is "a
pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over any period of time evidencing a con-
tinuity of purpose").
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have a shelter program, and many have a coalition against domestic violence
and sexual assault. State Attorneys General often have programs for victims,
and national resources, such as the National Domestic Violence Hotline
((800)799-7233) exist as well. What the lawyer may not reasonably do is
nothing.
V. A LAWYER'S DUTY TO WARN1 63
Traditionally, a lawyer owes a duty of confidentiality to each client, a
duty which prevents the lawyer from disclosing information, even when
such disclosure might significantly benefit others. ' That prohibition is not
absolute, however, and it is loosening. The American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ethical rules in all states, ex-
cept California permit a lawyer to disclose confidential information to
prevent certain types of criminal acts (at least those which will likely result
in imminent death or substantial bodily harm)."' Ethical rules in
163. This section is based, in part, on John M. Burman, Disclosing Privileged Communications:
A Lawyers Duy to Warn, WYOMING LAWYER, August 1996, at 17.
164. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 60 (2000).
165. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002) ("A lawyer may reveal informa-
tion relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary ... to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm"); see also
CAL. EvID. CODE § 956.5 (West 2002) (The California rules of conduct do not directly
regulate the duty of confidentiality) ("There is no privilege under this article if the lawyer
reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication relating to repre-
sentation of a client is necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm."); IND.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) ("[L]awyer may reveal such information to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing
any criminal act .... ); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILIrY R. DR 4-101(c)(3)
(2002) ("A lawyer may reveal . . . [t]he intention of a client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime.").
The ABA House of Delegates adopted amendments to Rule 1.6 in February of
2002. As amended, Rule 1.6(b) provides (deletions are shown by a-s-ikeett, additions
are shown by underlining):
(b) A lawyer may reveal stteh information relating to the representation ofa
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent thc: c .fr cPTrgacrimal ...t t.h..t. ea..
4i !. i. in im, inen reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm; of
(2) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
f (3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the cli-
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eleven 166 states require a lawyer to disclose such information. A developing
body of tort law regarding other professionals imposes liability on profes-
sionals who fail to disclose confidential information to warn a non-patient.
Taken together, these developments suggest that a profound change is oc-
curring. A lawyer may well have, and should have, a duty to warn an
intended victim of domestic violence, even when doing so results in the
disclosure of otherwise confidential information.
A. The Duty of Confidentiality
1. Legal and Ethical Obligation to Retain Client Confidences
A lawyer has both a legal and an ethical obligation to maintain client
confidences. The legal obligation arises out of the law of agency,167 the law
of evidence (through the attorney-client privilege)168 and the rules of civil
ent was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning
the lawyer's representation of the client; or
(4) to comply with other law or a court order.
Report 401, as passed by the ABA House of Delegates. ABA Center for Professionalism,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-202report-summ.html. Although changes were made,
disclosure remains permissive. While disclosure remains discretionary, allowing disclo-
sure, according to new comment [6] "recognizes the overriding value of life and physical
integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to Report 401." Model Rules of
Prof Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 6.
166. Ariz. S. Ct. Rule 42 R.P.C. 1.6(b); Conn. R.P.C. 1.6(b); Fla. St. Bar Rule 4-1.6(b); 11.
St. S. Ct. R.P.C. 1.6; Nev. St. S. Ct. R.P.C. 156(2); N.J. R. R.P.C. 1.6(b)(1); N.M. R.
R.P.C. 16-106(B); N.D. R. R.P.C. 1.6(a); Tex. St. R.P.C. 1.05; Va. R. S. Ct. Pt. 6 § 2,
C.P.R. DR. 4-101; Wis. St. R.P.C. S.C.R. 20:1.6. With the exception of New Mexico,
the language used in these rules is "must reveal." In New Mexico, the language is "should
reveal." N.M. R. R.P.C. 16-106(B). Davalene Cooper, The Ethical Rules Lack Ethics:
Tort Liahility When A Lawyer Fails to Warn A Third Party ofA Client's Threat to Cause
Serious Physical Harm Or Death, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 479, 480-81, note 4 (2000).
167. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 395 (1957)("[A]n agent is
subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information confiden-
tially given him by the principal.").
168. The attorney-client privilege is part of the law in every American jurisdiction, either by
statute, court rule, or common-law. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
§ 6.3.1 (1986). Generally, it prevents an attorney from testifying about communications
to, or from, a client and the lawyer regarding the representation. Id. Furthermore, an at-
torney has both a legal duty to assert the privilege in at least some circumstances and an
ethical obligation to assert the attorney-client privilege to prevent the disclosure of client
confidences. See FED. R. CIV. P 26(b)(5); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
cmt. 11 (2002).
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procedure (which embody the work-product privilege).16 9 Each requires a
lawyer to preserve client confidences, and each survives the termination of
the attorney-client relationship. 7 ' A lawyer's ethical obligation of confiden-
tiality is based on applicable rules of professional conduct. Such rules
generally provide that a lawyer shall not reveal any information which re-
lates to the representation, regardless of the source.17 ' Similar to the legal
duty of confidentiality, the ethical duty never ends. 72
The attorney-client privilege applies when communications between a
lawyer and a client are sought from an attorney or a client through judicial
or other legal processes, including discovery.'73 The ethical duty applies in
all other situations; it will generally be the duty that applies to permit or
require the disclosure of a client's intent to commit domestic violence.174
The attorney work-product privilege applies to information other than
communications to or from an attorney and a client. It proscribes the dis-
closure of an attorney's "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories" if they were developed in anticipation of, or preparation for, litiga-
tion. "' Regardless of the nature of the confidentiality obligation, the power
to waive it rests with the client, not with the attorney."'
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
170. After the end of an agency relationship, the agent may not use or disclose "trade secrets,
written lists of names, or other similar confidential information concerning matters ....
The agent is entitled to use general information concerning the method of business of
the principal." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1958). And while many
statutes or rules which establish the attorney-client privilege are silent on the question of
whether the privilege continues after the end of the attorney-client relationship, courts
generally hold that the privilege continues, along with the attorney's obligation to assert
it. WOLFRAM, supra note 168, § 6.3.4. The privilege generally extends after the death of
a client. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 406 (1998).
171. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002) ("A lawyer shall not reveal in-
formation relating to representation of a client .... ).
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c), 1.6 cmt. 17.
173. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3. The attorney-client privilege is not a
part of the rules of ethics. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. 3, 11. It is
part of the law of evidence and definitions vary in different jurisdictions. The privilege
generally exists when four features a present: (1) There is a communication; (2) between
privileged persons (an attorney or the attorney's staff and a client); (3) made in confi-
dence; and (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).
174. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 5.
175. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). A lawyer must assert the privilege or it disappears.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
176. A principal (a client) may agree to allow the agent (the lawyer) to disclose or use other-
wise confidential information. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958). A
client may waive the attorney-client privilege and permit an attorney to testify. See, e.g.,
Wolfram, supra note 168, § 6.4.1. A client may consent to the disclosure of information
protected by the rules of ethics. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
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The duty of confidentiality, whether legal or ethical, exists to encour-
age clients to communicate "fully and frankly with counsel." 177 This
encouragement does not come without a price which is sometimes a steep
one. For example, lawyers are not permitted to disclose, and juries are not
permitted to hear, information, such as a client's confession or admission to
a lawyer, information that could clarify an individual's guilt or innocence in
a criminal trial, or a client's liability or non-liability in a civil case. Similarly,
a lawyer who knows of a batterer's intent to commit further domestic vio-
lence has traditionally been free from any obligation to warn the intended
victim, even when she is readily identifiable and the batterer's intent and
the severity of the injury seem clear. The price of confidentiality is worth
paying, according to the United States Supreme Court, because maintain-
ing confidentiality "promote [s] broader public interests in the observance of
law and the administration of justice." '178 While that may be generally true,
significant inroads already have been made into the confidential relation-
ship between a lawyer and the lawyer's client. 7' It is time to re-evaluate the
premise of confidentiality as a superior value to public safety when it comes
to domestic violence.
2. The Scope and Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality
A lawyer's duty of confidentiality, whatever its source and nature, has
never been absolute; other considerations, ethical or legal may over-ride it.
Sometimes disclosure of client confidences is required by law, while at
other times, is simply permitted.
By statute in many jurisdictions, for example, attorneys are required to
report suspected child and/or elder abuse, notwithstanding the otherwise
Similarly, the work-product privilege belongs to the client and may be waived by the cli-
ent. Wolfram, supra note 168, § 6.6.3.
177. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407 (1998) (holding that the
federal law attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (The ethical duty of confidentiality encour-
ages clients "to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing
or legally damaging subject matter.").
178. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981)).
179. The most significant inroad is the recent promulgation of rules by Attorney General
John Ashcroft, which permits the United States Department of Justice to "monitor[] or
review ... communications between [an] inmate and attorneys.., who are traditionally
covered by the attorney-client privilege for the purposes of deterring future act that
could result in death or serious bodily injury .... 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001).
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confidential nature of the information learned from a client. 80 Similarly,
the ethical rules in eleven states now require the disclosure of information
to prevent death or serious bodily harm. 8"
The exceptions to a lawyer's ethical duty of confidentiality vary,
depending on the jurisdiction where the lawyer practices. Generally, there
are four views. First, the American Bar Association's recently amended
Model Rules say: "A lawyer may reveal information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary ... to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm."'8 Similarly, the rules in eighteen jurisdictions are patterned after the
previous Model Rule 1.6(b) and permit, but do not require, an attorney to
disclose confidential information when the attorney "reasonably believes
[disclosure is] necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result" in substantial bodily harm or
death. Several jurisdictions further impose an "imminent" death
requirement, before a lawyer discloses otherwise confidential information.'83
The largest group of jurisdictions, twenty-one, subscribe to the second,
more liberal approach. Under that approach, a lawyer may reveal
confidential information when the lawyer reasonably believes that
disclosure is necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime.
180. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West 2002) ("[A] n individual who has reason to
believe that a child is a victim of child abuse or neglect shall make a report as required by
this article."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-811 ("When the professionals and other per-
sons listed... have reasonable cause to suspect that an older person.., they shall report
the matter."); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West 2002) ("No person described
in division (A)(1)(b) of this section ... shall fail to immediately report that knowledge
[of child abuse]."); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 2001) ("Any person who
knows or has a reasonable cause to believe or suspect that a child has been abused...
shall immediately report .... ); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-103(a) ("Any person who
knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a disabled adult is abused. .. shall report
.... ").
181. Cooper, supra note 166, at 481 n.4.
182. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)(2002).
183. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1). The eighteen jurisdictions are: Ala-
bama (AL R RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Alaska (AK R RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Delaware (DE
RRPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); District of Columbia (DC R RPC Rule 1.6 (c)(1)); Georgia
(GA R BAR Rule 4-102 Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Hawaii (HI R S CT EXA RPC Rule 1.6
(c)(1)); Kentucky (KY ST S CT RULE 3.130 RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Louisiana (LA ST
BAR ART 16 RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Maryland (MD R CTS J AND ATTYS RPC Rule
1.6 (b)(1)); Massachusetts (MA R S CT RULE 3:07 Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Missouri (MO R
RULE 4 Rule 4-1.6 (b)(1)); Montana (MT R RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)): New Hampshire
(NH R RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); New Mexico (NM R RPC Rule 16-106 B) ("a lawyer
should reveal"); Pennsylvania (PA ST RPC Rule 1.6 (c)(1)); Rhode Island (RI R S CT
ART V RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); South Dakota (SD ST T. 16, Ch 16-18, APP, Rule 1.6
(b)(1)); and Utah (UT R RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)).
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However, there is no requirement that the crime be one which is likely to
result in physical injury, let alone serious physical injury."4 Eleven states
take a third approach. Those states impose an affirmative ethical obligation
on attorneys to disclose confidential information when the lawyer
reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent the client from committing a
crime which is likely to result in death or substantial injury. 5 Those
jurisdictions also permit an attorney to disclose confidential information to
prevent other, lesser crimes. Finally, one state, California, has a unique
approach to a lawyer's confidentiality duty. California is the only American
jurisdiction whose ethical rules do not create an obligation of confidentiality;
the California Rules of Professional Conduct are silent. 86 The California
Business and Professional Code, however, does impose such an obligation: "It
is the duty of an attorney... [t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." 
187
The California statute does not permit or require the disclosure of
confidential information, under any circumstances, even to prevent
substantial bodily harm or death.
In sum, lawyers in eleven jurisdictions have an ethical duty to disclose
confidential information to protect third parties in some circumstances. 8"
That ethical duty, at least arguably, creates a legal duty to disclose, a duty
which may form the basis for a tort claim. The unexcused violation of a
184. Arkansas (AR R RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Colorado (CO ST RPC Rule 1.6 (b)); Idaho (ID
R RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Indiana (IN ST RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Iowa (IA ST CPR DR
4-101 (C)(3)); Kansas (KS R RULE 226 RPC KRPC 1.6 (b)(1)); Maine (ME R CPR
Rule 3.6 (h)(4)); Michigan (MI R MRPC 1.6 (c)(4)); Minnesota (MN ST RPC Rule
1.6 (b)(3)); Mississippi (MS R RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Nebraska (NE R CPR DR 4-101
(C)(3)); New York (NY ST CPR DR 4-101 C.3); North Carolina (NC R BAR Ch 2,
Rule 1.6 (d)(4)); Ohio (OH ST CPR DR 4-101 (C)(3)); Oklahoma (OK ST RPC Rule
1.6 (b)(1)); Oregon (OR R CPR DR 4-101 (C)(3)); South Carolina (SC RA CT RULE
407 RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Tennessee (TN R S CT RULE 8 CPR DR 4-101 (C)(3));
Washington (WA R RPC 1.6 (b)(1)); West Virginia (WV R RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); and
Wyoming (WY ST RPC Rule 1.6 (b)(1)).
185. Arizona (AZ ST S CT RULE 42 RPC ER 1.6 (b)); Connecticut (CT R RPC Rule 1.6
(b); Florida (FL ST BAR Rule 4-1.6 (b)(1)); Illinois (IL ST S CT RPC Rule 1.6 (b));
Nevada (NV ST S CT Rule 156 2)); New Jersey (NJ R RPC 1.6 (b)(1); North Dakota
(ND R RPC Rule 1.6 (a)); Texas (TX ST RPC Rule 1.05 (e)); Vermont (VT R PROF
COND Rule 1.6 (b)(1)); Virginia (VA R S CT PT 6 S 2 RPC Rule 1.6 (c)(1); and
Wisconsin WI ST RPC SCR 20:1.6 (b))
186. In 1998, the California Supreme Court rejected, without comment, a proposal from the
California State Bar to include a confidentiality provision, similar to that in ABA Model
Rule 1.6, in the California Rules of Professional Conduct. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT, Chapter 3, ed's note.
187. CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2002).
188. See supra note 185.
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statute or administrative regulation may be used as the basis for imposing a
tort duty. "9 It is easy to argue that the violation of a rule of ethics should
have the same effect. 190
By contrast, thirty-nine American jurisdictions permit, but do not re-
quire, certain disclosures."' Additionally, since each of the rules is
discretionary, the rules also provide that a lawyer's decision not to disclose
information in such circumstances does not violate the rules." 2 Therefore, a
lawyer in those jurisdictions never has an ethicalduty to warn an intended
victim of a crime. In the absence of an ethical duty, the argument that a
violation of such a duty gives rise to a legal duty obviously does not apply.
While a lawyer in most jurisdictions has the discretion to warn of a cli-
ent's intended crime, the lawyer does not have the discretion to do nothing.
Instead, the lawyer must at least discuss the matter with the client and ad-
vise him or her of the potential consequences of the intended action." This
duty arises out of a lawyer's general obligation to communicate sufficient
information to a client to allow the client to make "informed decisions re-
garding the representation,""194 a lawyer's obligation not to assist or counsel a
client to commit a criminal or fraudulent act, 19 5 and a lawyer's ability to
refer to non-legal factors in advising a client."' Taken together, those stan-
dards suggest that a lawyer who learns of a client's intent to commit a
crime, which is likely to cause serious injury, has a duty to consult with the
client and advise him or her against doing so.' 9'
189. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 286 (1965).
190. Cooper, supra note 166, at 513 ("This article contends that in those jurisdictions requir-
ing disclosure, a lawyer who fails to give such a warning should be subject to tort liability
for failure to do so .... "). It is true that the rules say "[v] iolation of a Rule should not it-
self give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in
such a case that a legal duty has been breached." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Scope 18. Nevertheless, the rules are generally admissible in court so long as an expert
testifies that the rules reflect, rather than create, the standard of conduct. See Note, The
Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal Malp ractice: Erasing a Double Standard, 109
HARV. L. REv. 1102, 1105 (1996).
191. See supra notes 182-84.
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 13; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Scope 14.
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), 1.4(b), 2.1; See also infra note 197 and
accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT EC 7-8.
195. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).
196. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1.
197. A lawyer counseling a client against committing a crime appears to be very effective. In
1993, Professor Levin conducted an empirical study of New Jersey lawyers which
showed both that lawyers confront the issue of clients intending criminal action fairly of-
ten, and that the lawyers are generally successful in persuading the client not to commit
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Even in those jurisdictions where there is no ethical duty to warn, a
lawyer may have a legal duty to warn which arises outside the rules of eth-
ics. "' The question which is largely unanswered is whether a common law
legal duty exists which requires a lawyer who learns of potential domestic
violence to warn the intended victim, notwithstanding the absence of an
ethical obligation to do so. This issue is especially important for a lawyer
who represents a batterer, since he or she may well learn information about
future domestic violence in the course of representing the batterer.
Whether a lawyer has a legal duty to warn a non-client, other than
statutory reporting obligations for suspected child or elder abuse, is unclear.
If a legal duty does exist, the duty is an outgrowth of the California Su-
preme Court's decision in Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of
California."9 In Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court held that a psycho-
therapist may have a duty to warn a non-patient of a patient's intent to
harm the non-patient, in some circumstances. 20 0 An accurate understanding
of the Court's holding is crucial to an accurate understanding of the scope
and nature of a lawyer's duty to warn.
B. The Tarasoff Case
Prosenjit Poddar was a voluntary outpatient receiving mental health
services at a University of California at Berkeley hospital. 20 ' He met with a
the acts. Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to
Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 111-12 (1994). First, Pro-
fessor Levin found that sixty-seven out of 776 responding lawyers reported that they had,
at least once in their careers, reasonably believed that a client intended to commit future
crime which would cause serious injury to another. Second, the study found that lawyers
who reasonably believed that their clients were going to seriously harm a third party tried
to convince the clients not to do so. Id. at 117. The lawyers believed they had been suc-
cessful in persuading their clients not to commit the crimes 92.4% of the time. Id.
Finally, Professor Levin's study found that lawyers with an ethical duty to disclose the
threat only did so about half of the time. Id. at 128. This, she concludes, is likely ex-
plained by "the strong bar ethic concerning protection of client confidences." Id at 130.
198. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 10 ("Other law may require that a law-
yer disclose information about a client. Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a
question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. When disclosure of information relat-
ing to the representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the
matter with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law su-
persedes this Rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(4) permits the lawyer to make
such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.").
199. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
200. Id. at 340.
201. Id. at 341.
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therapist, Dr. Moore, seven times, before discontinuing treatment. During
the therapy, Poddar disclosed that he was obsessed with a young woman,
not named but readily identifiable as Tatiana Tarasoff. While she may have
had some feeling for him at one time, that had come to an end, at least in
her mind. Poddar, however, remained obsessed. He told his therapist that
he intended to kill the young woman when she returned from spending the
summer in Brazil.
Poddar's therapist discussed the statement with his supervisor, and
they decided to notify the campus police and request that the police detain
Poddar for possible commitment. The police took Poddar into custody, but
released him after he promised to stay away from Tatiana. Several weeks
later, Tatiana returned home. No one told her or her parents of Poddar's
threat. Shortly thereafter, Poddar killed her. Tatiana's parents sued the
therapist and his supervisor (and others), alleging, inter alia, that they had
had a duty to warn Tatiana of Poddar's threat, and they had failed to do so.
The trial court sustained the therapists' demurrer to the complaint,
ruling that the therapists were not liable for Tatiana's death because it was
caused by Poddar, a third party, with whom the therapists had a confiden-
tial relationship.2 2 The case made its way to the California Supreme Court,
which ultimately ruled (the court issued two opinions, an initial decision
and a decision on rehearing)2 3 in favor of the plaintiffs. In its opinion on
rehearing, the court said that a legally cognizable tort claim could be stated
if the complaint alleged that:
[T]he therapists in fact determined that Poddar presented a serious
danger of violence to Tatiana, or pursuant to the standards of their
profession should have so determined, but nevertheless failed to ex-
ercise reasonable care to protect her from that danger.
20 4
The issue thus became whether the standards of the profession of
psychology required the therapists to determine that Poddar presented a
threat to Tatiana, and whether those standards required that the therapists
take some action to protect Tatiana from that threat.205 Under some
circumstances, the obligation to take reasonable steps to protect the
intended victim might include a duty to warn that person. 2°' Given the
procedural posture of Tarasoff(an appeal from the granting of a demurrer),
202. Id. at 340.
203. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974), vacated, by 551 P.2d 334
(Cal. 1976).
204. 551 P.2d at 353.
205. Id. at 345.
206. Id. at 346.
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the California Supreme Court naturally did not decide those issues. Rather,
the Court held that a complaint that contained such allegations would state
a cause of action against the therapists." 7
The key to the Tarasoffopinion, and the key to whether a therapist has
a duty to warn, is how to determine when a therapist owes a duty to a third
party. The court looked at two issues to answer the question. First, the
court considered whether there was a "special relationship" which imposed
liability on one person, the therapist, for the actions of another, the pa-208209
tient.' °s Second, the court had to balance several policy factors.
The court had no difficulty finding a special relationship which could
form the basis for tort liability for a therapist failing to warn the intended
victim of one of the therapist's patients. Such a relationship may arise, said
the court, because of the defendant's relationship to "either the person
whose conduct needs to be controlled or ... the foreseeable victim of that
conduct., 0 Applying that exception to the allegations, the Tarasoffcourt
found "that a relationship of defendant therapists to either Tatiana or
Poddar will suffice to establish a duty of care ....
Turning to policy considerations, the court said that "[t]he most im-
portant of these considerations in establishing duty is foreseeability" of
harm.' As a general matter, therefore, a defendant owes a duty of care to
all persons "who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct. ' 2 3 When the
foreseeable harm involves a third party, however, a defendant is legally re-
sponsible only if a "special relationship" exists between the defendant and
the dangerous person or the defendant and the endangered person.2 4 Since
the court had found such a relationship between Poddar's therapist and
either Poddar or Tatiana, and since it was foreseeable that Poddar would
207. Id. at 353.
208. Id. at 343.
209. Id. at 342. The "major" factors to be considered are:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defen-
dant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability,
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id.
210. Id. at 343.
211. Id.
212. Id. at342
213. Id.
214. Id. at 343.
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harm Tatiana, a duty of care arose, requiring the therapists to exercise rea-
sonable care to protect her.
The court acknowledged that whether Poddar's actions in harming
Tatiana were foreseeable depended, in large part, on the therapists predict-
ing dangerousness, a notoriously difficult task.21 5 That difficulty was
insufficient, however, to eliminate any duty:
[W]e do not require that the therapist... render a perfect per-
formance; the therapist need only exercise that reasonable degree
of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by
members of [that professional specialty] under similar circum-
216
stances.
The court also weighed the risk of unnecessary disclosures and the
costs of requiring psychologists to violate the confidentiality of the psy-
chologist-patient relationship, against the possibility of a warning saving an
intended victim's life. "The protective privilege ends," said the court,
"where the public peril begins., 217
C. The Afrermath of Tarasoff
Tarasoff has been cited hundreds of times by courts throughout the
country.1 8 Many of the cases involve the issue of whether professionals have
a duty to disclose confidential information to protect third parties.2"9 Many
others cite to Tarasoffs discussion of foreseeability as the key to determining
if and when a tort duty arises in other contexts.220
Tarasoffand the duty to warn have also been the topic of considerable
academic debate, some authors arguing in favor of lawyer's disclosing oth-
erwise confidential information when necessary to warn and others taking
the opposite view.' Tarasoffand the duty to warn have also been the topic
215. Id. at 345.
216. Id. (quoting Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P.2d 480, 484 (Cal. 1970)).
217. Id. at 34 7.
218. A WestLaw search on September 29, 2002, indicated 1565 citations.
219. See, e.g., Brady v. Hoper, 751 F.2d 329, 330 (10th Cir. 1984); Jablonski by Pahls v.
United States, 712 F.2d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 1983); and Hamman v. County of Mari-
copa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Ariz. 1989).
220. See, e.g., Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 204 (Wyo. 1995); and Gates v. Richardson,
719 P.2d 193, 194 (Wyo. 1986).
221. Professor Cooper has comprehensively analyzed the case and the subsequent debate.
Cooper, supra note 166.
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of nmeros aricle for . . 222of numerous articles for practitioners. That body of literature tends to
take a different, more pragmatic approach, generally suggesting that lawyers
221act as if they have a duty to warn.
The reception in the courts has been mixed. The California Supreme
Court itself has interpreted the opinion narrowly, refusing to extend its ap-
plicability beyond the situation where a therapist knows, or should know,
224of a patient's specific threat to harm an identifiable person. Other courts
have given the case a more expansive reading, suggesting that a duty to pre-
vent harm may exist even where there is not a specific, identifiable victim
(as it is not possible to warn a potential victim in such a case, appropriate
steps might include initiating commitment proceedings).2 2 5 The divergent
and often conflicting opinions make it impossible to say, with any degree of
certainty, what the "rule" of Tarasoffis, especially outside of California.
Whatever the precise legal effect of Tarasoff, the opinion has had a sig-
nificant effect on the medical profession, especially the mental health
profession. Some states have responded by enacting laws which require or
allow mental health professionals to warn. In others, courts have imposed
222. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 166; NancyJ. Moore, "In the Interests ofJustice": Balancing
Client Loyalty and the Public Good in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FoRuDHIaM L. Ruv.
1775 (2002).
223. 1 belong to the latter group, and have advised lawyers that:
Whether a lawyer has a duty to disclose confidential information to protect a
third party is, ultimately, a question of foreseeability. That is, is it foreseeable
that your client will cause harm to a third party? The only time it is foresee-
able is if the client makes a threat to harm a specific, identifiable person, and
you reasonably believe that the client will act on the threat. In such circum-
stances, the potential benefits of breaching the confidential attorney-client
relationship and taking steps to protect the potential victim seem to outweigh
the costs of breaching the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship
and giving a potentially false warning.
Burman, supra note 163.
224. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 736 (Cal. 1980) (refusing to require
action in response to a juvenile's threat to kill a young child in the neighborhood).
225. See, e.g., Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989).
226. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/11 (ii) (West 2002). ("Records and communications
may be disclosed ... when, and to the extent, a therapist, in his or her sole discretion,
determines that ... a clear, imminent risk of serious physical or mental injury or disease
or death being inflicted upon the recipient or by the recipient on himself or another.")
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1946(1) (West 2002). ("If a patient communicates to a
mental health professional who is treating the patient a threat of physical violence against
a reasonably identifiable third person and the recipient has the apparent intent and abil-
ity to carry out that threat in the foreseeable future, the mental health professional has a
duty to take action as prescribed in subsection (2).") (West 2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-38-113(a)(iv) (Lexis 2000). (A mental health professional may disclose confidential
2003]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
a Tarasoff-like duty to warn.127 The AMA has gone so far as to advise physi-
cians that they may have a duty to warn potential victims of domestic
violence.22 ' The failure to do so, concludes the AMA, may lead to medical
malpractice lawsuits.229
D. Lawyers and the Duty to Warn
Lawyers are among the professionals who may receive confidential in-
formation suggesting that a third party is at risk of serious harm from a
client. And, not surprisingly, lawyers have been the targets of lawsuits based
on their failure to warn. Surprisingly few reported cases, however, involve
lawyers and the duty to warn. Thus far, no reported case has held a lawyer
liable under a Tarasofftype theory of failure to warn a non-client about a
dangerous client. The issue is not about to go away, however, and it seems
inevitable that the case will arise in which a lawyer is found to have had
knowledge of a client's danger to an identifiable third party, the lawyer
failed to warn that party, the client harmed the third party, and that failure
is found to have been a legal cause of the third party's injury or death. The
question is not, therefore, whether such a case will arise, but when and un-
der what circumstances. When it does, it will be easy for a court to, as the
Tarasoff court did, find a special relationship between the lawyer and the
client or the victim, and that injury was foreseeable. As a result, a court
could easily find a duty to warn, which was breached, and that breach was a
legal cause of the injury. Liability, in short, will be imposed on a lawyer for
failing to warn. The question has both ethical and legal implications, impli-
cations which boards of professional responsibility and courts will need to
confront and resolve. Until they do, lawyers will need to try to bring order
to the chaos which surrounds the issue of when a lawyer must disclose con-
fidential information to warn a potential victim. That issue is likely to arise
in a case involving domestic violence.230
Since an act of domestic violence against another would be likely to re-
sult in substantial bodily harm, or be a criminal act, an attorney in those
information when "an immediate threat of physical violence against a readily identifiable
victim is disclosed..." to the professional.).
227. See, e.g., State v. Agacki, 595 N.W.2d 31 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
228. AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 19, at 18. The AMA provides a general exception to the
duty of confidentiality "[w]here a patient threatens to inflict serious bodily harm to an-
other person ... and there is a reasonable probability that the patient may carry out the
threat" AM. MED. Ass'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, 72 (1994).
229. AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 19, at 19.
230. For a discussion of a lawyer's duty to warn in a domestic violence situation, see Cooper,
supra note 166, at 519-22.
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jurisdictions which follow the ABA's position "may" disclose the client's
intention to commit such an act. Although the ethical duty is discretionary,
the commentary to the rule says that "a lawyer may be obligated or permit-
ted by other provisions of law to give information about a client."231
So the legal question remains: Does a lawyer have a duty to disclose a
client's intent to harm a specific, identifiable individual? Rather surpris-
ingly, there is not a lot of case law involving the issue. What case law there
is suggests that the duty, if it exists, is the narrow one outlined in Tarasoff.
In Hawkins v. King County,232 the Washington Court of Appeals di-
rectly addressed the issue of whether a lawyer has a duty to warn. The
Court held that a lawyer has no duty to warn a third person "unless it ap-
pears beyond a reasonable doubt that the client has formed a firm intention
to inflict serious personal injuries on an unknowing third person."233 Since
the potential victims in the case knew of the client's violent tendencies and
of his release from confinement, the court affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of the defendant lawyer.
A threat to a Washington judge involved both the common law duty
to warn and an attorney's obligations as an officer of the court. In State v.
Hansen, a recently discharged felon (Hansen), told a lawyer of his intent to
get a gun and "blow them all away, the prosecutor, the judge and the public
defender. ' The lawyer told the prosecutor and the judge of the threat,
leading to Hansen's arrest and conviction for the crime of intimidating a
judge. On appeal, Hansen urged reversal on the basis, inter alia, that the
lawyer had violated the attorney-client privilege in warning the judge.
The Washington Supreme Court found that Hansen had no attorney-
client relationship with the attorney who had disclosed the threat, but even
if there had been such a relationship, the privilege would not have applied
to the threats. Further, the court found that although the Washington
Rules of Professional Conduct did not require disclosure (Washington's
Rule 1.6 is permissive235), a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to
warn a judge of threats where the lawyer "has a reasonable belief that the
231. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 21.
232. 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
233. Id. at 365 (internal quotations omitted).
234. 862 P.2d 117, 118 (Wash. 1993).
235. Although Washington has adopted a form of the ABA's Model Rules, one of the changes
was to Rule 1.6. The Washington rule permits the disclosure of a client's intent to
"commit a crime," not just a crime which will result in "imminent death or substantial
bodily harm" as the ABA suggested. WASHINGTON COURT RULES, 40 (2002) (stating
that a lawyer may reveal client confidences if lawyer reasonably believes it necessary "[tlo
prevent the client from committing a crime.").
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threat is real." 236 The court distinguished Hansen from Hawkins because the
judge had been unaware of the threat, while the potential victims in
Hawkins had known of the client's dangerous tendencies.
The most recent reported decision involving a lawyer's alleged breach
of the duty to warn is In re Goebel. 237 The case arose in the context of a law-
yer disciplinary proceeding. In upholding a sanction against a lawyer, the
238
court noted that Indiana is a permissive disclosure state, and, therefore,
the lawyer had no ethical duty to warn the potential victim (who turned
out to be the actual victim), even when that victim was the husband of one
of the firm's other clients.239 The case did not involve, and the opinion does
not address, the lawyer's potential tort liability for failing to warn the vic-
tim.
Where does that leave lawyers? It depends on the jurisdiction. In the
majority of jurisdictions, lawyers have no ethical obligation to disclose a
client's threats of harm to another. In eleven they do.240 The failure to give a
warning when there is an ethical obligation to do so could easily give rise to
a tort claim. It is, after all, well-established that the violation of a statute,
administrative regulation, or ordinance that has been enacted to protect the
public or a segment thereof, will often result in tort liability.241 Such a result
is reasonably likely, even though the rules generally provide that violation of
them should not give rise to civil liability.
212
Courts have taken three general views of the admissibility of rules of
ethics in malpractice or other actions against lawyers.243 The most restrictive
view, adopted only in Arkansas and Washington, is that the rules are not
236. Hansen, 862 P.2d at 122.
237. 703 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. 1998).
238. Indiana is one of the twenty-one states which permits a lawyer to disclose otherwise
confidential information when the lawyer "reasonably believes" that disclosure is neces-
sary to prevent the client from committing "a crime." See INDIANA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6(b)(1). See also supra note 184 for the other twenty
states which permit such disclosure. Another eighteen states, and the ABA, take the more
restrictive view that a lawyer may only disclose information to prevent the commission of
a crime by the client which is likely to result in "imminent death or substantial bodily
harm." See supra note 183.
239. In re Goebel, 703 N.E.2d at 1048
240. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
242. The scope section of the Model Rules, adopted in the vast majority of jurisdictions, says:
"Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any pre-
sumption that a legal duty has been breached." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Scope 18.
243. See The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice: Erasing a Double
Standard, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1102 (1996) (discussing the admissibility of rules of ethics
in civil actions against lawyers).
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admissible. 24' The second view, adopted in the vast majority of states, is that
the rules are admissible if an expert testifies that they reflect the standard of
conduct. 21' Finally, in Michigan, the rules create a presumption regarding
the standard of conduct. 246 It is very likely, therefore, that in those jurisdic-
tions which require a lawyer to disclose information to prevent a client
from committing a crime which is likely to result in serious, physical harm,
the rules will become evidence in a civil trial against a lawyer who did not
meet the standard of conduct by failing to warn.
A lawyer, who practices in a jurisdiction where disclosure is ethically
discretionary, should not be sanguine. The absence of an ethical obligation
simply does not mean that no legal duty exists. Even assuming that the rule
of ethics which makes disclosure discretionary is admitted, it will not be
difficult for a plaintiff's lawyer to argue that a duty to warn existed because:
(1) a special relationship existed between the lawyer being sued and the
lawyer's client or the intended victim; and (2) serious bodily injury was
foreseeable. Those are the circumstances, of course, which led the
California Supreme Court to its holding in Tarasoff. And while that
opinion has yet to lead to liability for a lawyer, the analysis which led to the
holding is neither far-fetched nor easily disregarded.
First, many courts have cited Tarasoffs discussion of when a duty ex-
ists, focusing on the foreseeability of harm, just as the Hawkins court did.
Second, there will be cases where a client makes a specific threat to harm an
identifiable individual, and that is likely to occur in a case involving domes-
tic violence. Third, in such circumstances, it may be foreseeable, given what
the lawyer knows or reasonably believes about the client, that the client in-
tends to carry out the threat. Finally, there will be times where the potential
victim is unaware of the threat. In such circumstances, it will be easy for a
plaintiff's lawyer to argue, and for the court to find, that the lawyer had a
duty to warn because of the foreseeability of the harm. It will then be easy
for a jury to find that the lawyer's breach of that duty caused the harm.
Given the ease with which the Tarasoffcourt dealt with the issue of a
special relationship, whether a lawyer has a duty to disclose confidential
information to protect a third party is, ultimately, a question of
foreseeability. That is, is it foreseeable that a client will cause harm to a
third party? The only time it is foreseeable is if the client makes a threat to
harm a specific, identifiable person, and the lawyer reasonably believe that
the client will act on the threat. In such circumstances, the potential
244. See id. at 1104.
245. See id. at 1105.
246. See id.
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benefits of breaching the generally confidential attorney-client relationship
and taking steps to protect the potential victim seem to outweigh the costs
of breaching the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship and
giving a potentially false warning.
VI. SUMMARY
Domestic violence has always been and will likely always be a signifi-
cant issue. For too long, everyone, including lawyers, pretended it did not
exist. As domestic violence has emerged from the shadows, the magnitude
of the problem has become apparent, and it is staggering. While we might
all wish the problem would just go away, it's not going to, and all of us,
especially lawyers, need to modify our behavior to take the problem into
account.
The legal and ethical standard for lawyers will likely always be to act
reasonably. While that standard has not changed, what a lawyer must do to
act reasonably is changing. It is simply no longer reasonable for a lawyer to
assert that he or she is not aware of the pervasiveness of domestic violence
or its potential impact on the representation of a client. With that knowl-
edge comes an obligation, the obligation to act reasonably to protect a
client's interests. The only way to effectively discharge that obligation is to
know if a client is a victim or perpetrator of domestic violence. The only
way to know if your client is affected by domestic violence is to screen the
client for domestic violence.
If screening reveals that a client or prospective client is a victim of do-
mestic violence, a lawyer needs to take at least one more important step.
The lawyer needs to either assist the individual in assessing the possibility of
future domestic violence (a lethality assessment) or refer her to someone
who will perform that assessment. If the lawyer's lethality assessment sug-
gests that the individual is in danger of further domestic violence, the
lawyer has another decision to make. Should the lawyer help the individual
develop a safety plan or should the lawyer refer her to someone who will? A
lawyer's choice to refer a victim or potential victim to an appropriate expert
or agency at any stage is perfectly reasonable. Similarly, a lawyer's choice to
assist an individual directly is also reasonable provided the lawyer has taken
the time to gain an understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and
how to respond properly and promptly. A lawyer's choice to do neither is
not reasonable.
Finally, the traditional view that lawyers owed no obligations to any-
one other than their clients is changing. The existence of an attorney-client
relationship is no longer critical to maintaining a successful civil action
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against a lawyer. Although the case has yet to arise, it is only a matter of
time before a court imposes liability on a lawyer for failing to warn the vic-
tim of a client's intended crime. Many lawyers already have an ethical duty
to warn. All lawyers should have a legal duty to do so.

